Why Takaichi’s Approval Ratings Fell in March After a Landslide Election Win

Table of Contents

Key Takeaways

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s approval ratings fell in multiple March polls, but they remain high by modern Japanese standards. The shift looks less like a collapse and more like a move from post-election enthusiasm to tougher day-to-day scrutiny.
The main driver was not a mass defection by core supporters. It was a cooling among swing voters and independents as inflation fears grew, helped by the Iran war, higher oil prices, and yen weakness.
Support for household relief has not disappeared. Polling still shows meaningful backing for temporary food tax cuts and anti-energy-shock measures, which suggests the government is being judged less on symbolism and more on whether it can protect living standards.

News

Multiple opinion polls in March showed a decline in support for Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s government. An FNN survey conducted on March 14-15 put cabinet approval at 67.1%, down 4.9 points from 72.0% in February, while disapproval rose to 28.5%, up 5.7 points. That was the first time her approval rating had dropped into the 60% range since the cabinet was formed.

A separate March 14-15 survey by Election Dot Com and JX News Agency found support at 56.1% by phone and 45.3% online, both lower than in the previous round. The decline points to fading post-election momentum, rising frustration over prices, and growing doubts about whether tax cuts and economic measures will actually ease pressure on households.

At the same time, the war involving Iran has made the political environment much harsher. Oil prices jumped, the yen weakened toward the 160-per-dollar area, and inflation risks intensified. In Japan, that combination quickly feeds into worries about gasoline, electricity, transport, and food costs.

Even so, voters have not rejected all parts of the government’s agenda. FNN polling showed 56.8% support for a two-year cut in the consumption tax on food to 0%, while 84.8% supported emergency measures such as subsidies and petroleum reserve releases to cushion the oil shock. That suggests public frustration with the cabinet is rising, but demand for cost-of-living relief remains strong.

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Analysis

Why March mattered more than February

The key question is not why a weak government got weaker. The key question is why a government that had just won a landslide election in February began to lose altitude in March.

Takaichi entered office in October with unusual momentum. As Japan’s first female prime minister, she benefited from a sense of novelty, a strong leadership image, and the promise of a more assertive economic strategy. That momentum was reinforced by the ruling party’s sweeping victory in the February 8 lower-house election. In other words, the government did not enter March in obvious trouble. It entered March with expectations still running high.

What changed in March was that politics moved out of campaign mode and into governing mode. Once the election was over, voters no longer judged the government mainly on energy, symbolism, or political momentum. They began judging it on inflation, budget management, foreign policy risk, and whether daily life felt more secure or more expensive. That was the real turning point.

The real story was the cooling of the middle

The drop does not look like a sudden revolt by Takaichi’s hard core supporters. It looks more like a gradual cooling among middle-of-the-road voters who had been willing to give her a chance.

That distinction matters. Early support for the Takaichi government was driven partly by policy hopes, but also by broader expectations that she might shake up a stagnant political system. That kind of support is powerful in an election. It is also fragile once living costs rise and the external environment worsens. In March, swing voters were not necessarily moving into the opposition camp. They were becoming more cautious.

This is why the polling decline should not be overstated. Approval has fallen, but it is still high by the standards of recent Japanese governments. The bigger shift is qualitative. Voters who were previously willing to project optimism onto the government are now asking whether it can deliver practical stability.

The Iran war changed the political climate

The single biggest March shock was the escalation of the Iran war.

Since late February, the conflict has pushed oil prices sharply higher and intensified pressure on the yen. For an energy-importing country like Japan, that is politically toxic. Rising oil prices are not an abstract geopolitical issue. They quickly become a domestic issue through fuel bills, utility costs, freight charges, and food prices. The more the conflict threatens shipping and energy markets, the harder it becomes for any Japanese government to maintain a stable political mood.

That is why March felt different from the months before it. Takaichi’s political strengths, including her strategic messaging and strong-state image, suddenly had to compete with a much simpler voter concern: everyday affordability. Once that happens, long-term national strategy tends to lose attention to immediate household anxiety.

The budget fight became a test of governing skill

The 2026 budget battle also mattered, though more as a test of governing competence than as the core cause of falling approval.

The ruling coalition has major strength in the lower house, but not in the upper house. That means passing the budget requires more than electoral dominance. It requires negotiation, management, and disciplined parliamentary tactics. This exposed a different side of power. Winning elections and running a divided parliament are not the same thing.

For supporters, Takaichi’s forceful style can look decisive. For less committed voters, the same style can look rough or overconfident when the government is forced into compromise. In March, that gap became more visible. The budget process itself was not the sole reason support fell, but it became one more area where swing voters began to judge the government less as a campaign machine and more as an administration.

Sanaenomics moved from promise to proof

Takaichi’s economic framework, often described as “Sanaenomics,” benefited for months from being seen as a bold alternative to drift. It promised active fiscal policy, strategic investment, and a stronger national economic posture.

March was the month when that story moved into a harsher phase. Voters were no longer asking only whether the vision sounded strong. They were asking whether it could protect their real purchasing power under external stress. That is a much tougher test. An economic strategy can still be popular in principle and lose support in practice if prices keep rising faster than confidence.

This is why the March decline should not be read as a full rejection of Takaichi’s agenda. It is better understood as the beginning of a proof phase. The government is now being measured less by the scale of its ambitions and more by whether families feel any relief.

Why the decline is serious, but not fatal

The available numbers do not show a government in immediate collapse. They show a government entering a more difficult stage.

There is still substantial public appetite for direct household support, including temporary food tax cuts and anti-oil-shock measures. That means voters have not closed the door on the administration. But it also means expectations have narrowed. People are less interested in broad political momentum and more interested in tangible cost-of-living outcomes.

That is the central meaning of March. Takaichi did not suddenly lose all credibility. Instead, the premium she enjoyed from novelty, momentum, and post-election strength started to fade as war-driven inflation and governing constraints became harder to ignore.

Conclusion

Takaichi’s approval ratings fell in March because the political environment changed faster than the government’s narrative could adapt. A landslide election victory in February created momentum, but the Iran war, rising oil prices, yen weakness, and the harder realities of budget politics pushed voters back toward practical concerns.

The most important point is that this was not mainly a rebellion by her base. It was a cooling among the middle. Voters who had been willing to believe in change started asking whether the government could protect them from rising living costs and external shocks. That is a much more demanding standard.

So the March decline should be seen less as a collapse than as the start of a tougher, more grounded phase of judgment. Takaichi’s next test is straightforward: can her government turn political strength into visible relief for households while managing budget pressure and geopolitical instability at the same time?