Key Points
ใปThe head of Czech intelligence told the Guardian on September 20, 2026 that a limited Russian incursion into NATO territory, false flag provocations and a large influence campaign could come in months rather than years. In the same article the head of Latvian intelligence said his service sees no indications of an imminent attack.
ใปThe preceding two weeks brought flares fired from a Russian frigate at a Danish helicopter, the first shootdown of a drone in Lithuanian airspace, Belarusian exercises along the Suwalki corridor and a warning from Poland’s prime minister about attacks Russia might describe as accidents. European governments responded with infrastructure protection plans and proposals for common procedures.
ใปWith the Ukrainian front stalled and a head on war against NATO extremely costly, the cheapest way for Russia to change the course of that war is to thin out European support. Pressure therefore flows into the space below the threshold of war, and Europe is left deciding, case by case, whether each incident was an accident or an attack dressed as one.
A Czech Warning About Months, and a Run of Close Encounters
The Guardian published interviews with the intelligence chiefs of three European countries on September 20, 2026. Michal Koudelka, the director of the Czech security service, said Russia may be planning more decisive action that could include a limited incursion into NATO territory, false flag provocations and a massive influence campaign, and that such a scenario could unfold in months, not years.
Normunds Mezviets, the director of the Latvian security service, said in the same article that his service does not see indications of an imminent attack, and that whether Moscow has direct and concrete plans or is simply spreading fear and uncertainty remains an open question.
In the early hours of September 15 two Italian Air Force fighters flying NATO’s Baltic air policing mission shot down a drone that had entered Lithuanian airspace. It was the first shootdown over Lithuanian territory, and the Lithuanian defence minister said the aircraft was carrying an explosive device. President Gitanas Nauseda said the following day that the drone appeared to be a Russian Gerbera type and that the most likely explanation was a drone bound for Ukraine pushed off course by Ukrainian electronic warfare. The launch point and the responsible party have not been officially established.
The day before that, a Russian Navy frigate in international waters in the Baltic Sea fired two flares towards a Danish military helicopter, one of which passed within metres of it. Denmark said the helicopter was on a routine surveillance flight following standard procedure. Russia protested that the Danish aircraft had manoeuvred dangerously near its ship.
Prime Minister Donald Tusk told the Polish parliament on September 17 that Russia may be planning to strike countries supporting Ukraine with drones or missiles and then describe the strikes as accidents. The purpose, he said, would be to paralyse NATO and to demonstrate that Article 5, the collective defence provision, is more theoretical than practical. The chair of NATO’s Military Committee said on September 19 that airspace violations, drone incidents and hybrid activities over recent weeks and months continue to test allied resolve.
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September’s Run of Incidents and the Map They Sit On
A hybrid threat, in the European Union’s usage, refers to a mixture of military and non military actions, drone incursions, cyber attacks, arson, sabotage of railways and power grids, interference with undersea cables and information operations, combined so that attribution is difficult. The EU dates the sharp rise in such activity against member states to 2022.
September in sequence
Each of these events is small on its own, and they form a pattern only when placed in order. The prologue is an explosive laden drone found at Leipzig airport in Germany in early August, and September opens with the German government’s conclusion on September 1 that Russia was involved. After that a train was struck by a drone on the Ukrainian side of the Polish border, a Russian frigate fired flares at a Danish helicopter in the Baltic, and a drone was shot down over Lithuania the next day.
In the same week the Belarusian army began exercises near the Polish and Lithuanian borders, around the Suwalki corridor, and Poland’s prime minister warned parliament that Russia might present an attack as an accident. Europe’s response moved quickly from there. The President of the European Commission proposed a European Security Council and a common procedure for responding to hybrid attacks, President Macron ordered a plan to defend critical infrastructure, and Poland joined a European anti ballistic missile coalition.
That weekend Ukraine launched its largest drone attack yet on the area around Moscow, and the Guardian published the interviews in which the phrase about months, not years appeared alongside the judgement that no attack is imminent.
| Date | Place | Confirmed facts | Claims and open points |
|---|---|---|---|
| September 1 | Germany | The government concluded that Russia was involved in the explosive laden drone found at Leipzig airport in early August | Russia denies involvement. The perpetrators are still under investigation |
| September 10 | Arctic Ocean | Reuters reported that British, Norwegian and American forces disrupted a rehearsal for sabotage of undersea cables near Svalbard in the spring | Account of NATO side officials. No Russian account |
| September 13 | Western Ukraine | A Russian drone hit the locomotive of a Warsaw bound train about 2km from the Polish border. No casualties | That former European leaders on board were the target is a claim by Ukrainian Railways. Not NATO territory |
| September 14 | Baltic Sea | A Russian frigate fired two flares at a Danish military helicopter | Denmark: routine mission. Russia: dangerous manoeuvring |
| September 15 | Lithuania | Italian jets on NATO duty shot down an explosive laden drone | The president called a diverted Ukraine bound drone the most likely explanation. Launch point and actor unconfirmed |
| September 15 to 18 | Near the Suwalki corridor | Belarusian forces held four days of exercises on the Polish and Lithuanian borders | Belarus says no offensive action is under consideration. Nothing indicates preparation for an invasion |
| September 16 to 18 | Across Europe | The Commission President proposed a European Security Council. President Macron ordered an infrastructure defence plan. Poland joined the anti ballistic missile coalition | All at the proposal or planning stage |
| September 17 | Polish parliament | Prime Minister Tusk warned of attacks that could be presented as accidents | The originating agency was not disclosed |
| September 20 | Around Moscow | A large Ukrainian drone attack. A refinery was hit | Interception and casualty figures are Russian statements |
September 1 to 20, 2026. Compiled from government statements, NATO, Reuters, the Guardian and LRT.
Of all of these, the shootdown over Lithuania is the only case in which a weapon was used inside the territory of a NATO member. No authority has described any of these events as a sign of invasion, and what the intelligence services are watching is the continuation of this kind of contact and sabotage itself.
Why the Suwalki Gap anchors the map
The Belarusian exercises drew attention within this run of events because of where they took place. The Suwalki Gap is the only land route connecting the Baltic states to the main body of NATO. It is a belt of territory where north eastern Poland meets south western Lithuania, and its length is usually given as somewhere around 100km, with the Guardian putting it at 80km in September 2026 and Euronews at 104km.
To the west lies the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, and to the east lies Belarus.
If the belt is closed, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are cut off by land from the other allies. That geography is why this corner has been treated since the end of the Cold War as one of the most dangerous places for any real collision between NATO and Russia. The exercises took place outside the belt, and Belarus says it is not considering offensive action.
There is a borrowed quality in the air as well. The Baltic states operate no fighter aircraft capable of defending their own airspace, and since they joined in 2004 other members have rotated squadrons through on four month tours. That is why the aircraft that shot down the drone over Lithuania were Italian, and it is why a single drone carries political weight in a place where a thin strip of land meets borrowed air cover.
What counts as an attack below the threshold of war
Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty is a mechanism for consultation among allies about a security threat, and it is not a precondition for invoking Article 5, the collective defence provision. Article 5 becomes applicable when an event is judged to be an armed attack and the country attacked asks for collective defence. Even then, the measures each ally takes are the actions it deems necessary, which need not be military. In the case of a single drone, all of that comes after a judgement about whose aircraft it was and whether the entry was accidental or deliberate.
Thomas Nilsson, the head of Sweden’s military intelligence service, told the Guardian that Moscow would love NATO to hold endless Article 4 consultations and come up with no actions.
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The war itself is getting heavier
Behind the rise in incidents along the border sits an intensification of the main war. In the early hours of September 20 Ukraine struck targets across Russia including the area around Moscow, and the Russian Defence Ministry said it had intercepted 1,110 drones in a single night. Russian authorities put the total for the weekend above 1,600, of which about 450 were reported over the Moscow direction, and a refinery in Moscow was hit, with three deaths reported in the Moscow region.
If the Lithuanian president’s account is right, the drone that came down in Lithuania was part of that exchange, a machine heading for Ukraine that was pushed off course by electronic warfare. These border incidents are less a separate front than the spillover of a war that is growing heavier.
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Why Russia Pushes on Europe While the Ukrainian Front Stands Still
A head on war is too costly, so the pressure flows below the threshold
Starting a new large scale conventional war against NATO as a whole would be extremely costly for Russia in its present condition. Four and a half years of fighting in Ukraine have not moved the front decisively, and in September the area around Moscow absorbed the largest drone attack of the war. The first reaction on the English language forums, a puzzled question about what exactly Russia would attack with, comes from the fact that everybody knows this.
The reason the pressure on Europe stays below the level of war is that both sides understand a direct war could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Because the cost of a full war is so high, pressure runs instead into drones, undersea cables, cyber operations and sabotage, the space that is not treated as war. Nuclear deterrence raises the threshold for a full war, but it offers no guarantee that limited pressure and misidentification will stay safe.
The aim is to raise the price of European support
The cheapest way for Russia to change the course of the war is to thin out the European support standing behind Ukraine. Koudelka described the current Russian tactic as escalating in order to make the other side back off, and said Moscow believes that if it escalates enough, European countries will decide not to support Ukraine. Mezviets said the targets of sabotage, at first indiscriminate, have narrowed towards railways, infrastructure supporting Ukraine and now the defence industry.
The effectiveness of this pressure lies less in the damage than in the burden of judgement. The Lithuanian president explained the drone as most likely a machine bound for Ukraine that was diverted by electronic warfare, and the next day the Polish prime minister warned that Russia may be planning to describe attacks as accidents.
Tusk’s warning was a general intelligence assessment about what may come, while the Lithuanian drone itself is assessed by the president as most likely accidental. There is no evidence linking the two, and the problem is that an accidental crossing and a deliberate provocation can look the same from the outside.
The side that fires does not know, at the moment it destroys the aircraft, whether it was a drone that strayed or a drone sent under cover of straying. The answer is assembled afterwards from debris and flight paths, and each time another one is shot down NATO carries the question of whether this was an accident. When Koudelka said that every fire and every malfunction now has to be investigated by intelligence services as a potential terrorist attack, and that this is a good result for the other side, that burden is what he meant.
Russia’s account, and why its neighbours do not accept it
The Kremlin spokesman has dismissed talk of an attack on NATO as having nothing to do with reality or with Russia’s intentions. Russian officials have described the situation created by Finnish and Swedish accession, which left every Baltic coast except Russia’s own inside NATO, as an attempt to turn the sea into a NATO lake, and over the Danish helicopter Russia made the specific claim that the aircraft flew dangerously close to its ship.
The reason the Baltic states and Poland do not accept that account is that they watched a neighbour actually invaded in 2022. Russia has a security argument about NATO enlargement, and that argument needs to be kept separate from findings of fact about individual airspace violations and acts of sabotage.
How Europe’s guard actually moved
What stands out in the immediate response to this run of incidents is work on procedures for judging and for protecting. In Baltic airspace the rules allowing fighters deployed by other allies to shoot down a drone were used in practice, the Commission President proposed a common procedure for requesting consultations along with a European Security Council, and President Macron ordered a plan to defend infrastructure including defence industry sites. The anti ballistic missile coalition Poland joined is an effort to build interceptors in Europe more cheaply than American ones.
Behind this sits the fact that the United States has put in writing a direction in which Europe’s defence falls to Europe. The 2026 National Defense Strategy, published in January 2026, states on page 14 that “As U.S. forces focus on Homeland defense and the Indo-Pacific, our allies and partners elsewhere will take primary responsibility for their own defense with critical but more limited support from American forces.” On September 18 a review of the American force posture in Europe was reported to be under consideration. How much of the roughly 80,000 troops stationed there would move has not been decided.
At the same time, the officials closest to Russia are the most careful about stoking a sense of imminence. Jonatan Vseviov, secretary general of the Estonian foreign ministry, criticised social media panic on September 19 and wrote that if there is reason to fear an attack, his government will make that clear, and that until then people should keep calm and continue supporting Ukraine. Spreading fear is itself one of the objectives of Russian psychological operations, and that judgement is behind his post.
Why does the phrase “World War III” keep coming up?
Looked at on its own, Europe is a story about rising tension between NATO and Russia. Seen globally, the war between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, which began at the end of February, has run for about seven months, the Houthis said on September 19 that they had attacked the Saudi capital, and oil is above 100 dollars a barrel. In East Asia, Japan and Taiwan are watching how support for Taiwan is handled ahead of the US China summit on September 24.
What these three have in common is the American military. According to a CSIS analysis published in August 2026, European dependence on the United States remains heavy in integrated command and control, intelligence fusion and advanced air and missile defence, while Europe is moving fastest on capabilities such as aerial refuelling. These are the same kinds of forces used in operations in the Middle East.
The National Defense Strategy itself states on page 13 that “It is only prudent for the United States and its allies to be prepared for the possibility that one or more potential opponents might act together in a coordinated or opportunistic fashion across multiple theaters.” The assumption is that when American forces are tied down in one region, the calculations of actors elsewhere may change. That is not a claim that anyone is planning a world war. It is a possibility placed there to be prepared for.
Even so, no camp is running these three crises from a single headquarters. Several reports say Russia is supplying Iran with drones and targeting information, while China depends heavily on Middle Eastern crude, and Reuters reported in September 2026, citing anonymous sources, that China pressed Iran to rein in the Houthis at Saudi Arabia’s request. A picture of a new axis against the West cannot account for that Chinese interest.
In World War I no set of governments jointly planned the final shape of the war, while alliance commitments, mobilisation timetables and miscalculation chained one crisis to the next. The pattern Europe is watching for now, a chain of accidents, has the same shape, and the decisive difference is that nuclear armed states have kept avoiding a full war with each other. The year 1914 is material for explaining why the present is not yet on the same road.
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What would count as a step up?
The point at which this enters a new stage is when incidents that end in a shootdown and a protest begin to produce deaths. If people are killed inside the territory of a NATO member in an incident confirmed as a Russian attack, consultations among the allies carry a heavier question than they do now. The same applies if Russian forces begin to sit permanently rather than exercise around the Suwalki corridor, or if Russia moves to another large mobilisation.
If instead the pattern continues in which a drone enters, is shot down, protests are exchanged and it ends there, NATO will absorb this kind of contact as something it can process. European intelligence services expect this pressure to continue for as long as support for Ukraine continues, and as long as it continues Europe’s preparations advance too. Which way this exchange turns depends on what the debris of the next drone turns out to show.
Japanese Reactions to Europe’s “Eve of World War III” Talk
These are posts on X, not a measure of Japanese public opinion. The translations are summaries faithful to the sense of each post rather than word for word renderings, handles are omitted, and the like counts are those displayed on September 21, 2026.
The phrase “eve of the Third World War” has not settled into Japanese usage as a label for this European story. A search for the exact phrase returns mostly older posts, and what circulates now is looser: the eve of war, WW3, something is wrong in Europe. The strongest Japanese language posts were lists of events rather than arguments about them, and they carried the anxiety of a pattern without proposing a cause.
The most widely shared Japanese post on the subject, with about 9,700 likes, was one of those lists. It set out what had happened in Europe since the summer and closed on the feeling that a crisis is approaching, adding that Japanese television and newspapers have barely covered any of it.
ๆ่ฟใฎๆฌงๅทใฎๅใใใใใใๅคใใ่ตทใใฆใใใใจใงใใ
— May_Roma ใใใใพใ่ฐทๆฌ็็ฑ็พ (@May_Roma) September 19, 2026
็งใซใฏๅฑๆฉใ่ฟซใฃใฆใใใใใซๆใใพใใ
ๆฅๆฌใฎใใฌใใๆฐ่ใงใฏใปใจใใฉๅ ฑ้ใใใฆใใใพใใใญใ
ใปใใฉใณใๅคง็ตฑ้ ใๆฌงๅทใใ4ไธไบบใฎ็ฑณ่ปใๆค้ใใใจ็บ่กจ
ใปNATOใฎใธใงใใๆฉใใชใใขใใขไธ็ฉบใงใญใทใขใฎใใญใผใณใๆๅขโฆ
A list of what has been happening in Europe since the summer. To me it feels as though a crisis is approaching. Almost none of this is being reported on Japanese television or in the newspapers.
A widely followed Japanese commentator on X, September 19, 2026 (summary, translated by Sekahan)
One item in that list does not hold. It states that President Trump announced a withdrawal of 40,000 American troops from Europe. No such announcement has been made. On September 18, 2026 the Pentagon held a briefing on a review of the American force posture in Europe with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe taking part, and reporting has described figures of 25,000, and of between 25,000 and 40,000 out of roughly 80,000, as options under consideration rather than decisions. The complaint about thin Japanese coverage is also easy to check: Japanese editions of the BBC and Reuters both carried the Lithuanian shootdown on September 15.
The second largest post, with about 3,400 likes, used the word that gave this article its question. It said that recent conversations among European governments sound exactly like the eve of a war, and listed German planning to receive wounded soldiers, Polish civil evacuation plans and Swedish deployment exercises on Gotland. We have not independently verified those individual items, and what the post shows is how the word is being used rather than what is being planned.
ๆฌงๅทๅๅฝใฎๆ่ฟใฎไผ่ฉฑใใใๅฎๅ จใซๆฆไบๅๅคใชใใ…
— Dr.ใใ (@DrKarte) September 20, 2026
๐ฉ๐ชใใคใใ่ฒ ๅทๅ ตใ1ๆฅ1000ไบบๅบใๆณๅฎใง็ ้ขๆดใใฆใใใ
๐ต๐ฑใใผใฉใณใใใใกใฏๅฝๆฐใฎๅคง่ฆๆจก้ฟ้ฃ่จ็ปใคใใฃใใใ
๐ฑ๐นใชใใขใใขใใใกใใ
๐ธ๐ชในใฆใงใผใใณใใใคใใจไธ็ทใซใดใใใฉใณใๅณถใธ1500ไบบๆฅๆดพใใ็ทด็ฟใใฆใใใโฆ
The recent conversations among European governments really do sound like the eve of a war. Germany planning for wounded soldiers, Poland with civil evacuation plans, Sweden running deployment exercises on Gotland.
A Japanese account posting on current affairs, September 21, 2026 (summary, translated by Sekahan)
The sceptical side of the Japanese conversation is smaller in numbers and closer to what officials in the Baltic states have been saying. A post with about 210 likes said its author had deliberately avoided the phrase Third World War, and that the sudden increase in foreign posts announcing the start of WW3 struck him as nonsense.
็ฌฌ3ๆฌกไธ็ๅคงๆฆใฃใฆ่จ่ใฏใๆๅณ็ใซไฝฟใใชใใใใซใใฆใใใฉใใWW3ใๅงใพใใ๏ผใใฟใใใชใในใใๆตทๅคๅขใใใๅขใใฆใใฆใใใใซ่จใใชใฃใฆๆใใ
— ็ญ้ฑใฎใใใใค (@Money_tweet1118) September 20, 2026
I have been deliberately avoiding the phrase Third World War, but posts from abroad shouting that WW3 is starting keep increasing. Give me a break.
A Japanese account posting on markets and current affairs, September 20, 2026 (summary, translated by Sekahan)
That reading sits close to the Estonian foreign ministry’s criticism of social media panic. The division in Japanese is not between political camps but between two habits: listing the incidents, and estimating whether Russia has the capacity to act on them.
When a specialist used the phrase, it was about misjudgement rather than intent. Kazuto Suzuki of the University of Tokyo’s Graduate School of Public Policy quoted English language reporting on an AI generated intelligence assessment that had brought the United States and China close to a collision, and said he felt he had glimpsed how a third world war caused by AI might happen.
AIใๅผใ่ตทใใ็ฌฌไธๆฌกไธ็ๅคงๆฆใฎๅฏ่ฝๆงใๅฃ้่ฆใๆฐใใใใ https://t.co/Qr19epxOw5
— Kazuto Suzuki (@KS_1013) September 20, 2026
Reading this, I felt I had glimpsed the possibility of a third world war brought about by AI.
Kazuto Suzuki, University of Tokyo, September 20, 2026 (summary, translated by Sekahan)
That is the same structure as the European worry, arrived at from a different direction. What frightens people who follow this closely is not a decision to go to war but the chance that something is read wrongly and answered before the reading can be corrected. In Japanese as in English, the discussion mostly skips the step in between, which is who fired the drone and whether the entry was accidental or deliberate.
Pressure Below the Threshold, and a Europe That Keeps Judging It
The reason talk of a third world war spread is that Europe, the Middle East and East Asia have live crises at the same time, and American forces are involved in all three. What is actually happening in Europe, though, is narrower: with the Ukrainian front stalled, Russia is raising the price of European support while staying below the level of war, and Europe is strengthening its defences while deciding each time whether an event was an accident or an attack dressed as one.
The officials who have the most reason to fear Russian intentions, those in the Baltic states, are the most careful about stoking alarm. The assumption that held for thirty years after the Cold War, that a war between major powers would not happen in Europe, has broken down. What lies beyond it is not the outbreak of war but a period of carrying pressure below that threshold and the burden of judging it.
When the next drone comes down, asking not only where it came from but what it was aimed at and whose burden it increased changes how the picture looks.
Frequently Asked Questions
Has the United States announced a withdrawal of 40,000 troops from Europe?
No. As of September 18, 2026 the Pentagon was at the review stage, and a briefing on the review of American force posture in Europe was held that day with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe taking part. Reporting has described a reduction of 25,000, and a range of 25,000 to 40,000 out of the roughly 80,000 American troops in Europe, as options under discussion. No decision has been announced, though the claim that a withdrawal was announced has circulated widely on Japanese social media.
Is NATO’s Article 4 a precondition for Article 5?
No. Article 4 provides for consultation among allies when one of them considers its security threatened, and it is a separate mechanism rather than a step that must precede collective defence. Article 5 applies when an event is judged to be an armed attack and the country attacked seeks collective defence, and even then each ally takes the action it deems necessary, which is not necessarily military. Thomas Nilsson, head of Swedish military intelligence, told the Guardian that Moscow would be glad to see NATO hold endless Article 4 consultations and take no action.
Did the drone shot down over Lithuania come from Russia?
President Nauseda said on September 16, 2026 that it appeared to be a Russian Gerbera type and that the most likely explanation was a drone intended for Ukraine that was diverted by Ukrainian electronic warfare, adding that a deliberate attack on Lithuania was unlikely. Lithuanian authorities have said the drone appeared to enter from the direction of Belarus, but the launch point and the responsible party have not been officially confirmed, and the drone was carrying an explosive device according to the defence minister.
How did Japanese social media react to Europe’s “eve of World War III” talk?
The phrase itself has not caught on in Japanese, and the posts that travelled furthest were lists of European incidents rather than arguments about them, the largest drawing about 9,700 likes. That post also carried an unverified claim that a withdrawal of 40,000 American troops had been announced, which it has not been. Sceptical posts, closer to what Baltic officials are saying, drew hundreds of likes rather than thousands, and when a Japanese security specialist used the phrase third world war he was discussing escalation through misjudgement rather than a decision to attack.
Sekahan on YouTube
We publish video summaries of articles like this one, along with short clips built around Japanese reactions.
Reference Links
- European spy chiefs warn Moscow is planning more decisive action against Nato๏ฝThe Guardian
- Joint Press Conference by the Chair of the NATO Military Committee and the Chief of Defence of Denmark๏ฝNATO
- Nausฤda: drone shot down over Lithuania was Russian Gerbera headed for Ukraine๏ฝLRT
- Russian frigate fires flares towards Danish military helicopter๏ฝDefense News
- Poland’s prime minister warns of Russian ‘accidental’ attacks on Ukraine’s allies๏ฝNPR
- Air Policing๏ฝNATO
- 2026 National Defense Strategy๏ผPDF๏ผ๏ฝU.S. Department of Defense
- The Europe Force Posture Review and the Transition to NATO 3.0๏ฝCSIS
- Saudi-led coalition says defences intercept Houthi missile fired at Riyadh๏ฝAl Jazeera
