Key Points
・The Gaza ceasefire took effect on October 10, 2025. All living hostages and the remains of the dead have returned, but Israeli withdrawal, Hamas disarmament, the move to a new governing body and reconstruction have only reached the starting stage.
・The 20-point plan and UN Security Council Resolution 2803 contain a framework of monitoring, guarantees, an international force and phased withdrawal. The criteria for deciding whether withdrawal or disarmament comes first, the participating states and the response to violations are still unspecified.
・The hostage exchange moved because both sides received something at the same time. In the second phase, the cost of moving first falls on decision-makers, while the cost of standing still falls mostly on Gaza’s residents.
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One Year On, the Hostages Are Home but Phase Two Has Not Moved
The Gaza ceasefire reached its first anniversary on October 10, 2026. Under the first phase of the US-brokered agreement, the 20 living hostages were released on October 13, 2025, and the last hostage’s remains were recovered on January 26, 2026. On January 29, Israel returned the remains of 15 Palestinians, completing the first-phase exchanges, according to the Associated Press.
The second phase has not moved in the same way: phased Israeli withdrawal, Hamas disarmament, a transfer of governance, deployment of the International Stabilization Force and large-scale reconstruction. The Board of Peace and a committee of Palestinian technocrats were set up in January. According to the UN Special Coordinator’s September 24, 2026 report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, however, the committee has not yet been able to enter Gaza, the force’s personnel have not deployed, and early recovery is far below the scale needed.
According to Reuters’ October 6, 2026 explainer, the area held by Israeli forces behind the “Yellow Line” was about 53 percent of Gaza at the start of the ceasefire and has since grown to roughly two thirds. According to the Gaza Health Ministry, more than 1,400 people have been killed since the ceasefire. The Israeli military says five of its soldiers died in the same period.
Israel says it is targeting Hamas, while Hamas accuses Israel of violating the agreement. On October 9, more than 100 organizations including Amnesty International said in a joint statement that the ceasefire “exists in name only,” as reported by Al Jazeera.
On disarmament, Hamas said in late July that it accepted the Board of Peace’s roadmap and would store weapons under the new governing body’s control, according to Reuters. In August, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel would not withdraw from its current lines until Hamas was fully disarmed. Israel holds a general election on October 27.
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What the Ceasefire Framework Says, and Where It Stops
The “Yellow Line” is the line to which Israeli forces pulled back under the October 2025 ceasefire. Inside it, troops remain and residents’ access is restricted. Its position has shifted several times, and that is central to the current dispute.
Readers of this blog will know the broad outline of the conflict, so this section concentrates on the 2025 agreement. For the longer history, three layers matter for today’s disputes. Jerusalem is sacred to Judaism, Christianity and Islam, which makes the question of whom the city belongs to unusually heavy. Religion alone does not explain the war, since people of different faiths lived together in the Ottoman-era towns for long periods. Second, the founding of Israel in 1948 left about 700,000 Palestinians displaced, according to UN estimates, and about two thirds of Gaza’s residents are said to descend from them. Third, the 2005 Israeli withdrawal, Hamas’s 2006 election win and its 2007 takeover of Gaza are why “how far to pull back” and “who governs Gaza instead of Hamas” are still open.
Two years of war, and terms attributed to those who use them
Hamas killed about 1,200 people and took 251 hostages on October 7, 2023, and Israel then conducted military operations in Gaza for about two years. According to the Gaza Health Ministry, more than 74,000 people have died since October 2023. South Africa filed a case against Israel at the International Court of Justice in December 2023 under the Genocide Convention, and the court ordered provisional measures. The merits phase has not been decided. A UN commission of inquiry concluded in September 2025 that genocide was occurring, which the Israeli government rejects. The United States and the EU designate Hamas as a terrorist organization. This article treats these terms as the positions of the actors who use them.
The two-phase deal, read clause by clause
President Trump announced a 20-point plan on September 29, 2025, and the ceasefire took effect on October 10. The first phase had a mutual design: Israeli forces withdrew to an agreed line, all hostages were returned within 72 hours, detainees were released and aid expanded. Each side received something at the same moment, and it was carried out.
The second phase is built differently. Point 13 says disarmament will take place under independent monitors, and point 14 says regional partners will guarantee Hamas’s compliance. Point 16 says Israeli forces will withdraw “as the ISF establishes control and stability,” according to the full text published by NBC News, in line with “standards, milestones and timeframes linked to demilitarization” that Israel, the force, the guarantors and the United States are to agree. In other words, the sequence is left to criteria to be agreed later.
UN Security Council Resolution 2803, adopted on November 17, 2025 by 13 votes to none, with China and Russia abstaining and no veto cast, repeats the withdrawal clause of point 16 in the text of its seventh paragraph. The same paragraph authorizes the force to ensure the demilitarization process, protect civilians, train vetted Palestinian police and secure humanitarian corridors. Paragraph 8 authorizes the Board of Peace and the international presence until December 31, 2027.
So the framework exists. What the plan and the resolution do not state is which states will take part, by what criteria withdrawal will be judged, and what happens if someone violates the terms. The UN’s September report itself calls for “greater clarity on sequencing.”
Key numbers in one place
| Item | Figure | Source and date |
|---|---|---|
| Area under Israeli control | About 53% at the start, about two thirds by October 2026 | Reuters, October 6, 2026 |
| Area inaccessible or severely restricted | About two thirds of Gaza | UN Special Coordinator’s report, September 24, 2026 |
| Deaths since the ceasefire | More than 1,400 (1,471 as of October 9) | Gaza Health Ministry, via Al Jazeera and HRW |
| Israeli soldiers killed since the ceasefire | 5 | Israeli military, via Reuters |
| Reconstruction and recovery needs | About $71.4 billion over 10 years | World Bank, UN and EU assessment, April 20, 2026 |
| Board of Peace six-month recovery program | $2.45 billion | Board of Peace plan, September 23, 2026 |
| Countries pledging troops to the force | 6 | Reuters, October 6, 2026 |
| Resolution 2803 vote | 13 in favor, 0 against, 2 abstentions | UN Security Council, November 17, 2025 |
Who is supposed to carry out what
The Board of Peace is the interim administration chaired by President Trump, with responsibility for setting the framework and coordinating funds. The Palestinian technocratic committee is led by Ali Shaath, a former Palestinian Authority deputy minister, and is meant to run local administration but has not entered Gaza. The force is commanded by a US Army major general, and Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Albania, Kosovo and Uganda have pledged personnel, according to Reuters. Its mandate is set by the resolution, but when and where it deploys, and how much risk and cost the participants accept, are not settled.
Why a Sequence Without Criteria Stops Moving
Why did the hostage exchange move when phase two did not?
The first phase advanced because each side got something at once. Families of hostages were a powerful force pressing the Israeli government to compromise, and the hostages were also Hamas’s bargaining chip. After the exchange, both pressures probably weakened.
The campaign to bring hostages home spread across party lines, while the push for withdrawal has not done so. Hamas, for its part, has lost its bargaining chips and retains weapons and local organization. Repeated violations then compound the problem: each airstrike, expansion of the line or retained weapon reduces the expectation that the other side will honor its part, which raises the cost of moving first. Violations and cost-benefit calculations are not separate causes. They reinforce each other.
Withdrawal or disarmament first: both sides have reasons
Israel’s position has a basis. Leaving while armed Hamas remains risks rearmament and renewed attack, and the Gaza takeover after the 2005 withdrawal shapes that judgment. For a country that lived through October 7, accepting a first move is a security calculation as well as a political one.
Hamas’s position is that giving up weapons without a guarantee of withdrawal would cement the occupation and remove its means of resistance. Organizational interest also plays a part, since weapons give Hamas coercive power inside Gaza as well as against Israel. Heavy weapons such as rockets are a different issue from rifles, security forces and tunnels. According to an October analysis by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, if Hamas keeps small arms it retains the power to obstruct a new administration. Residents’ interests differ from both: safety, return and a role in how Gaza is governed.
The US has its own reason to keep the design flexible, since a phased approach can be adapted to conditions on the ground. Yet when the Board of Peace in August sided with Israel’s ordering that withdrawal beyond the Yellow Line follows full disarmament, a guarantor took one party’s position.
A second drag is the gap in capacity to change the status quo. Israel can move the line, restrict deliveries and continue strikes unilaterally, while Hamas and residents have no equivalent tools. Waiting is not symmetrical: some actors gain from delay and others lose.
Does Northern Ireland offer a model for decommissioning first or power sharing first?
After the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the dispute over whether IRA decommissioning or power sharing came first repeatedly halted Northern Ireland’s government. An independent commission confirmed decommissioning in 2005, and the government resumed in 2007.
Three conditions present there are missing in Gaza: governments in London and Dublin with the power to enforce the deal, a direct-rule authority able to suspend and restart institutions, and a route for armed groups to enter politics through elections. The case is less a template than a ruler for measuring what Gaza lacks.
Who can replace Hamas, and who confirms them?
The ability to run administration is separate from legitimacy to represent residents. The technocratic committee, set up with foreign backing, has stayed outside Gaza for nearly a year. Even if it enters, the handover of salaries, police and municipal functions between it and the Palestinian Authority is undecided. The UN report says their liaison function has been “announced but is not yet fully operational.”
The Palestinian Authority is itself in financial crisis because Israel is withholding roughly $6 billion in clearance revenues, and salaries are months late. It has not governed Gaza since the 2007 split, and its public support is thin. Elections that could supply legitimacy have receded further. Palestinian legislative elections were scheduled for November 28, but on October 10, 2026, President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree postponing them and combining them with a presidential vote on September 11, 2027, according to the official Wafa news agency as reported by Al Jazeera. The stated reasons included Israeli military operations and settlement expansion in the West Bank, the withholding of Palestinian tax revenues, and the lack of progress on reconstruction and on deploying the stabilization force in Gaza. The last such election, in 2006, ended in a Hamas victory and the split, an experience that weighs on the decision.
Why does each guarantor stall for its own reasons?
Ahead of the October 27 election, the political cost of withdrawal for Israel is at its highest. Reuters reported that a right-wing minister in the coalition renewed calls in September for residents to leave Gaza, as a move to rally supporters. Researchers link the rejection of the roadmap to the governing coalition’s base and election pressure, but not every decision by the prime minister can be attributed to electoral politics. Security concerns are real, and starting a process to address them carries a political burden of its own. Some prominent opposition figures support Trump’s plan, so the election result could shift the sequencing debate.
The United States is both designer and guarantor. It provided the funding framework and the Board of Peace but did not fix the order, and in August it took Israel’s side. Its diplomatic bargaining with Saudi Arabia, which links normalization to civil nuclear cooperation, depends on Gaza because Riyadh seeks a path to a Palestinian state.
Neighboring states cannot be lumped together as pro-Hamas. In their joint statement of September 22, eight countries including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Türkiye called for disarmament, Israeli withdrawal, an international force, a new administration and reconstruction as a package, and rejected forced displacement. They want to avoid both an armed Hamas and a fixed occupation or displacement. As for the force, the meaning of deployment changes depending on whether the mission is protecting supplies, disarming Hamas or fighting armed groups. Reuters reported that Indonesia put its deployment on hold in March after the US and Israeli strikes on Iran.
The costs of the stall are not evenly distributed. Decision-makers in governments and armed groups gain political benefit from standing still, while casualties, displacement and loss of homes fall on residents. Each westward shift of the line compresses the area where residents are crowded, and slow reconstruction can increase pressure to leave. Statements by ministers calling for emigration are documented, but there is no basis for asserting that every delay is aimed at emigration. Even so, the longer a supposedly temporary division lasts, the more likely it is to be treated as permanent.
Japanese Reactions to the Gaza Ceasefire Anniversary
This section covers posts on X. They are reactions on X, not a measure of Japanese public opinion. Around the anniversary, the most widely shared Japanese-language posts were news organizations sharing their own reporting, and individual posts that spread widely were few. Below are two newsroom posts that framed the day, followed by three individual voices: a reporter, a translator who posts stories from Gaza, and a writer reacting to a news report.
The most widely shared post was from BBC News Japan on October 9, with more than 600 likes.
BBCニュース – 停戦から1年のガザ、ほぼ毎日イスラエル軍の空爆 病院では保育器が足りずhttps://t.co/6kvCxpLrnL pic.twitter.com/aB18VCfuDO
— BBC News Japan (@bbcnewsjapan) October 9, 2026
“One year after the ceasefire, Israeli military airstrikes hit Gaza almost every day. Hospitals do not have enough incubators.”
BBC News Japan, October 9, 2026 (translation of the post text)
Mainichi Shimbun’s post on October 10 focused on the line itself.
停戦後も続く「強制退去」 ガザの「境界」動かすイスラエル軍https://t.co/FQjFdXTy04
— 毎日新聞 (@mainichi) October 10, 2026
パレスチナ自治区ガザ地区では1年前に停戦が発効しましたが、イスラエル軍はガザの3分の2を支配しており、多くの住民が避難生活を強いられています。
“‘Forced evictions’ continue after the ceasefire: the Israeli military keeps moving Gaza’s ‘boundary.’ A ceasefire took effect in Gaza a year ago, but the Israeli military controls two thirds of the Strip and many residents are forced to live as evacuees.”
Mainichi Shimbun, October 10, 2026 (translation of the post text)
The reporter who wrote that Mainichi story, Daichi Matsuoka, added his own note when sharing it. It is one of the few Japanese posts that puts the Israeli rationale and the residents’ loss in the same breath.
こちらは、イエローライン拡大の話を取材しています。イスラエルにとっては、境界からガザ住民を遠ざけて「安全」を確保したのかもしれませんが、ガザの人にとっては、土地や生業も奪われています。
— 松岡大地(毎日新聞記者) Daichi Matsuoka (@DDmatsuoka) October 10, 2026
停戦後も続く「強制退去」 ガザの「境界」動かすイスラエル軍 – 毎日新聞https://t.co/4RwitajK1r
“This is my reporting on the expansion of the Yellow Line. For Israel, pushing Gaza’s residents away from the boundary may have secured ‘safety.’ For the people of Gaza, it has also taken away their land and their livelihoods.”
Daichi Matsuoka, Mainichi Shimbun reporter, October 10, 2026 (translation of the post text)
The individual post about Gaza that spread most widely in Japanese in the weeks before the anniversary was not about the negotiations at all. Shohei Haraguchi, who translates stories from Gaza into Japanese, posted this on September 24, and it drew more than 500 likes.
ガザの養蜂家、アフマド・ジハード・カハルートさん。
— Shohei Haraguchi 原口昇平 (@ShoheiHaraguchi) September 24, 2026
遠い草地へ蜂が蜜を集めに行けるよう、危険を冒してでもイスラエル軍が迫るイエローラインぎりぎりに巣箱を置く。
ガザの農業環境は完全に破壊された。
それでも蜂はわずかな花から蜜を集め、新たな巣を作る。そこに希望を見出している。#ガザ翻訳 pic.twitter.com/p4vcyDnTCy
“A beekeeper in Gaza, Ahmad Jihad Kahlout. So that his bees can reach distant pastures, he takes the risk of placing his hives right up against the Yellow Line, where the Israeli military is closing in. Gaza’s farmland has been completely destroyed. Even so, the bees gather nectar from the few flowers left and build new hives. He finds hope in that.”
Shohei Haraguchi, September 24, 2026 (translation of the post text)
Reactions from ordinary readers mostly took the form of sharing a report with a quoted line. The writer Mako Saiki shared a Mainichi story about a ten-year-old girl shot while eating with her family in a tent, under the headline “a ceasefire in name only.”
『アマル・アブ・ハテルさん（当時10歳）は午後3時ごろ、家族と遅い昼食を取ろうとしていた。ご飯の支度ができ、テントで身を起こした瞬間、突然悲鳴を上げて倒れ込んだ』
— さいき まこ『言え誰』紙書籍発売！ (@SaikiMako) October 10, 2026
緊迫する中東情勢：テントで食事中、銃弾が娘を貫いた 「名ばかりの停戦」続くガザ | 毎日新聞 https://t.co/ITWqvsMlgX https://t.co/BhxYAExwmj
“‘Amal Abu Khater, then ten years old, was about to have a late lunch with her family at around three in the afternoon. The food was ready, and the moment she sat up in the tent, she suddenly screamed and collapsed.’ From Mainichi: a bullet pierced a daughter during a meal in a tent, as a ‘ceasefire in name only’ continues in Gaza.”
Mako Saiki, October 10, 2026 (translation of the post text)
Taken together, the posts give a consistent picture. The center of Japanese coverage and of the individual reactions we found was that airstrikes continue after the ceasefire, that the line keeps moving, and that reconstruction is not progressing. Individual posts tended to criticize the Israeli government, and posts emphasizing Hamas’s disarmament first were few and drew little engagement. Search results come in recent-first excerpts, so this cannot show proportions, and we left out hostile posts aimed at individuals and posts from small accounts.
Who Pays the Cost of Moving First?
A ceasefire that has lasted a year has not led to peace. The reason lies partly in accumulated violations and partly in the design of the agreement beneath them. The framework is complete, yet no criteria fix whether withdrawal or disarmament comes first, so only the stages where both sides receive something at once have advanced.
Within that structure, Gaza’s residents pay the most. The older disputes layered through history, land, refugees’ return, occupation and withdrawal, and who governs, have not gone away, and the sequencing problem rests on top of them.
The next movement will probably come when someone with authority writes down the steps. The United States and the guarantors could put withdrawal and disarmament criteria and verification procedures on paper, the troop-contributing states could accept a deployment date and its burden, and the technocratic committee could agree a handover with the Palestinian Authority and enter Gaza. If any one of these happens, the calculations of the others change. After Israel’s October 27 election, the question at the start of the ceasefire’s second year is who will take that step first.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why has the Gaza ceasefire not led to Israeli withdrawal or Hamas disarmament?
The agreement does not fix which comes first. According to the full text of the 20-point plan published by NBC News, withdrawal is tied to criteria that Israel, the force, the guarantors and the United States are to agree later. Each side points to the other’s violations, and the cost of moving first falls on decision-makers.
Is the Gaza ceasefire still holding?
Only partly. The UN Special Coordinator’s September 24, 2026 report says the ceasefire ended major fighting and brought all hostages home, but strikes and ground operations have continued. According to the Gaza Health Ministry, more than 1,400 people have been killed since the ceasefire, and Israel says it is targeting Hamas preparations.
What is the International Stabilization Force?
It is a temporary force authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 2803 in November 2025, passed 13 to 0 with two abstentions. According to Reuters’ October 6, 2026 explainer, six countries have pledged personnel but the force has not deployed. Its mission includes demilitarization, protecting civilians and training Palestinian police.
How did Japanese media and social media react to the Gaza ceasefire anniversary?
On X, the most widely shared posts came from news organizations such as BBC News Japan and Mainichi Shimbun, and the individual posts we found came from a reporter, a translator of Gaza stories and ordinary readers sharing reports. Their common focus was that airstrikes continue, the Yellow Line keeps moving and reconstruction is not progressing. This is a selection of what search surfaced, not a measure of Japanese public opinion.
Sekahan on YouTube
We publish video summaries of articles like this one, along with short clips built around Japanese reactions.
Reference Links
- UNSCO Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, September 2026 | United Nations (UNISPAL)
- One year on, Trump’s Gaza plan has not stopped Israeli fire or disarmed Hamas, explainer | Reuters via The Jerusalem Post
- Read Trump’s plan for peace in Gaza (full 20-point text) | NBC News
- Gaza: Ceasefire Anniversary Marks Year of Failed Promises | Human Rights Watch
- Gaza ceasefire ‘exists in name only’, more than 100 NGOs say | Al Jazeera
- Assessing the Gaza Ceasefire: Year One | The Washington Institute
- Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of Türkiye, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE, 22 September 2026 | Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Abbas postpones Palestinian legislative elections to September 2027 | Al Jazeera
- Milestones: 1945 to 1952, The Arab-Israeli War of 1948 | US Department of State, Office of the Historian
