Key Points
ใปThe 20th Asian Games in Aichi and Nagoya, with about 17,000 registered athletes and officials, saw long waits to board a cruise ship used as housing, mixed-up room assignments, team buses that never arrived and a wrong national anthem, and South Korea’s delegation protested to the organising committee and the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA).
ใปAfter the Tokyo 2020 bribery and bid-rigging scandals, the Aichi-Nagoya Games did not hand operations to a single advertising agency, built no athletes’ village, split housing across hotels, a cruise ship and temporary lodging, and one month before the opening saw registrations exceed the contracted accommodation capacity.
ใปThe problems clustered less in housing or transport as such than in the handoffs between the organising committee, contractors and delegations, which leaves a question for the next major event: once the single-agency model is taken apart, who holds the job of integrating many separate operators?
Asian Games Without an Athletes’ Village Face Accommodation and Transport Problems From the Start
The 20th Asian Games opened in Aichi and Nagoya on September 19, 2026, and run until October 4. According to the organisers, about 17,000 athletes and officials from 45 countries and regions are competing in 469 events across 43 sports. No athletes’ village was built. Delegations are split between a cruise ship moored at Nagoya Port (about 4,000 people), temporary modular lodging at the port (about 2,000 people) and hotels inside and outside Aichi Prefecture, according to the organising committee.
Boarding and accreditation on the cruise ship began on September 16, and several delegations were reported to have waited for long periods. On September 17, a deputy chef de mission of Japan’s team said rooms had been assigned by headcount alone, so that in some cases men and women, or coaches and athletes, were placed together, and that the team was considering its backup accommodation, Reuters reported. India’s chef de mission told reporters on September 18 that there had been an accommodation shortage.
On September 18, North Korea’s anthem was played instead of South Korea’s before a men’s hockey match between South Korea and Bangladesh in Gifu Prefecture. On September 20, a practice shuttle for South Korea’s men’s basketball team, which was preparing for the final, did not arrive, and South Korea’s delegation protested to the OCA and said it would send letters of protest to the organising committee and the OCA, according to Yonhap. On September 21, late team buses delayed the start of several women’s volleyball matches, Japanese media reported.
On September 22, the organising committee said on its website that the main cause of the boarding delays was incomplete documents submitted by some delegations, and that the food criticised on social media at one venue had not been provided by the committee. At a media briefing the same day, a deputy secretary general apologised and said the bus and anthem failures were “mostly human error,” according to Jiji Press. On September 24, the committee said it had “not studied enough” the different needs and customs of athletes.
Related Articles
How Japan Changed the Way It Runs Major Events After Tokyo 2020
An athletes’ village is the complex where competitors and team officials live during a multi-sport event, and it usually doubles as the operational hub where accreditation, dining, medical care, security and team transport are concentrated in one place. The Aichi-Nagoya Games replaced that hub with a network of separate sites.
An athletes’ village is where a Games is held together
At the Olympics or the Asian Games, delegations normally arrive at the village, complete their accreditation (the registration that gives each participant an ID pass), move into their rooms and, the next morning, walk to the bus terminal on the same grounds to go to their venues. Dining halls, team service desks and the medical centre sit within the same fence.
Aichi-Nagoya originally planned to build a village on the site of the former Nagoya racecourse. In March 2023, the organising committee dropped the plan as rising material prices pushed up construction costs, and switched to renting hotel rooms, according to Nikkei. Under the Host City Contract signed in 2018, the term “athletes’ village” is defined as the accommodation facilities as a whole, including hotel rooms, so the contract allows a Games without a purpose-built village.
Housing was then divided between the cruise ship at Nagoya Port, the port’s modular lodging and hotels across the region, while venues spread across Aichi and into Gifu, Shizuoka, Tokyo and Osaka. With both lodging and venues dispersed, the registration, dining and transport functions a village would normally concentrate were split among different places and different operators.
Splitting teams across hotels looks simple, but it also splits the registration desks, meals and bus departure points, and it means that each delegation’s numbers and schedules have to be collected again every day. The more places people sleep, the more the Games depend on who does that collecting, and where.
Taking apart the single-agency model after Tokyo 2020
For decades, major events in Japan were typically coordinated with a large advertising agency at the centre. That model drew heavy criticism after the Tokyo 2020 Olympics bribery case and a bid-rigging case over contracts for the Games’ test events, in which Dentsu, Japan’s largest advertising agency, was among the companies indicted.
According to Nikkei, Aichi Prefecture barred Dentsu from its public tenders for 14 months from February 2023, and Dentsu, which had been named as the marketing agency for Aichi-Nagoya, withdrew the same month.
The organising committee then split the work. Sponsorship sales went to a four-company consortium led by a Nagoya advertising firm. According to GL events, the French event company won a contract covering site design, temporary infrastructure, access and accreditation systems and medal ceremonies for 58 venues. The cruise ship was secured through JTB, Japan’s largest travel company. Allocation of rooms is handled by the organising committee’s own accommodation management centre, and planning team bus services is also the committee’s job.
Jiji Press reported that sponsorship revenue reached about 27 billion yen, above target, so the split contracting has delivered commercially.
| Function | Who is responsible |
|---|---|
| Owning the Games, adding sports, reporting participant numbers | OCA |
| Room allocation and accommodation management, team bus planning | Organising committee (in house) |
| Securing the cruise ship, accommodation services for Games participants | JTB |
| Design and operation of 58 venues, access and accreditation systems, medal ceremonies | GL events |
| Sponsorship sales | Four-company consortium led by a Nagoya advertising firm |
| Spectator transport, traffic control, city operations | Aichi Prefecture and Nagoya City |
| Contractor operating team buses, operator of the modular lodging, company that played the anthems | Not disclosed |
Compiled by Sekahan from public documents released by the organising committee, Aichi Prefecture and the companies, as of September 25, 2026.
Moving toward transparency and competitive tendering is a natural response to the Tokyo 2020 cases. Yet splitting work that had been concentrated in one company across several contractors and the committee’s own departments means far more hands are involved than at Tokyo 2020. The contractors have not published their own accounts during the Games, and public information shows who handled which handoff only as far as the organising committee’s internal structure.
From 15,000 to about 17,000 participants, and a change in plans one month out
According to the Host City Contract signed in 2018 by the OCA, Aichi Prefecture and Nagoya City, the hosts must provide accommodation for up to 15,000 people, and the OCA was to report the final expected number of participants to the organising committee at least one year before the Games. In practice, more countries entered some sports, two sports were added at the OCA’s request, and the OCA has stated that more than 17,000 people had registered by the July 2026 entry deadline. As of late August, the organising committee said it did not regard that figure as final.
– August 24: The OCA told national Olympic committees that some team officials should arrange their own accommodation.
– August 25: Aichi Governor Hideaki Omura, who chairs the organising committee, told a press conference that “the contract is for 15,000 people, and that is the only budget we have prepared.”
– August 28: The organising committee said that “numbers change daily and have not been finalised.”
– August 29: The OCA and the organising committee issued a joint statement saying that everyone registered by the July deadline had been provided with accommodation and that, apart from exceptions, no further registrations would be accepted.
– September 15: The cruise ship arrived at Nagoya Port, and boarding procedures began the next day.
What the August 29 statement guaranteed was a bed for every registered person. Putting the right person in the right room, checking arrivals against the list and connecting them to the next morning’s bus were outside the statement, and how well that part worked became visible only after boarding began on September 16.
The 15,000 in the contract is a ceiling on the accommodation the hosts must provide, the 17,000 is the OCA’s registration-based figure, and the number of beds the organising committee actually arranged has not been published.
The increase is a little over one tenth, but housing was split across three types of lodging, and the shift of some officials to self-arranged rooms began only three weeks before the opening. In its explanations from September 22, the organising committee said that in many cases the rooming lists it had received in advance did not match the people who actually arrived, and that sorting this out at the accommodation desks took time.
What the OCA asked for: a bigger Games, no new buildings, lower costs
It was the organising committee, not the OCA, that decided not to build a village, and the decision was about cost. At a September 18 press conference, the OCA backed that choice, with its coordination committee chair saying the council did not want to leave behind a “white elephant,” a costly facility with no use after the Games, Reuters reported. Using existing facilities to hold down costs is a reasonable direction at a time when cities keep withdrawing from bids for international Games.
At the same time, the OCA wanted a Games of 469 events in 43 sports, larger than the Olympics, and in 2026 it added two more sports, increasing the number of participants. On the dispersed housing, the OCA asked the organising committee at a September 2024 coordination committee meeting to make team accommodation more concentrated and hub-like, according to an Aichi Prefecture document. The plan to place team headquarters, a dining hall and a bus terminal on the grounds of the modular lodging came out of that request.
Japanese media reported that the combined cost of the Asian Games and the Asian Para Games is expected to reach about 370 billion yen, more than three times the roughly 100 billion yen initially assumed for both events. The hosts’ cost decision, the OCA’s expansion of the programme and dispersed housing were three conditions that ended up stacked on a single Games.
The Problems Clustered at the Boundaries Between Operators
Why did problems cluster at the handoffs between operators?
The failures fall into three types. The boarding delays came from documents and rooming lists submitted by delegations not matching the people who arrived, so the checks took time. The missing and late buses occurred where changes in a team’s practice schedule failed to connect with vehicle dispatch. The anthem error was an operating mistake by a private contractor that had stored every competing nation’s anthem on the same device.
A one-off operating error on site and a failed handoff between several parties should be looked at separately. Even so, the housing and bus problems both occurred at the moment when the organising committee or a contractor had to receive information held by a delegation at the right time.
The organising committee said that changes to bus requests had to be made by 3 p.m. the previous day, and that some delegations changed plans the night before or were not there when the bus came to collect them. Vehicles and drivers were drawn from bus companies across the region, and some drivers from outside the prefecture were unfamiliar with local roads, Japanese media reported.
Organisers set deadlines to keep buses on schedule, and delegations change plans according to competition and athletes’ condition, and both have their reasons. At a Games where lodging and venues are far apart, the question of how much is the delegation’s responsibility to follow and how much the organiser takes on as exceptions was being tested every morning.
The organising committee’s “human error” explanation is accurate for individual incidents, but with failures announced across several areas in the same week, the question of how much better cross-cutting coordination could have prevented now needs an answer.
Who took over the integrating role after the single-agency model was dismantled?
Even before the Games, some commentators warned that Dentsu’s absence was a risk. The monthly magazine Sentaku reported in its July 2026 issue that Dentsu had run the previous Asian Games held in Japan, in Hiroshima, but had no role this time and that clouds hung over the operation, and after the opening, articles appeared citing calls for Dentsu’s “return.” On the other hand, the work planned for Dentsu at Aichi-Nagoya was sponsorship sales, and no public information shows that it was ever expected to handle accommodation or transport.
GL events, which won the venue operations contract, has been sued by a subcontractor over unpaid construction fees for a pavilion at Expo 2025 Osaka, Kansai, and it disputes the obligation to pay on the grounds that the work was not completed, the Tokyo Shimbun reported.
Some members of the Aichi Prefectural Assembly called for the contract to be reviewed. However, the scope of work GL events has published does not include accommodation or team transport, and no public information links this Games’ housing or bus problems to the company.
Rejecting the single-agency model after Tokyo 2020 was a natural consequence of the scandals. The bid-rigging case arose in the planning of test events, close to the operational core of the Games, and entrusting strong integrating power to one company without transparency is no longer an available option. The question is what was built in its place.
At this Games, the organising committee kept room allocation and transport planning in house and gave the ship and venue operations to separate contractors. Placing the integrating function inside the organising committee is a reasonable design in itself.
What public information does not show is how far that in-house department had the authority to issue instructions across accommodation, accreditation and transport, shared data on each delegation, and procedures for handling last-minute changes. Whether Dentsu’s absence was a cause will have to wait for an internal review; what is known is that the integrating role moved from “one company” to “an in-house department plus several contractors.”
Related article
Who Owns the World Cup? Why FIFA’s Plan to Sell a Stake Collapsed in Under Ten Days
What Hangzhou rehearsed with 6,200 people
At the previous Asian Games in Hangzhou, a full-element rehearsal involving about 6,200 people was held over two days at the end of August 2023 in the athletes’ village, the technical officials’ village and the media village, according to the Hangzhou organising committee. Working areas ran their chains of command through five scenarios: arrival and accreditation, daily operations, assembling for the opening ceremony, a full competition day and departure.
| Item | Hangzhou 2022 (held in 2023) | Aichi-Nagoya 2026 |
|---|---|---|
| Athletes’ village | Purpose-built (athletes’, technical officials’ and media villages) | None; hotels, a cruise ship and modular lodging |
| Integrated rehearsal | About 6,200 people over two days, 28 working areas, five scenarios | Not confirmed in public information |
| Preparation period | Extended by the one-year postponement | Original schedule |
Hangzhou figures are from the organising committee’s official announcements in Chinese and English, which agree on the numbers; the 28 working areas appear in the Chinese version.
Aichi-Nagoya is also required under the Host City Contract to hold test events for each sport, and these were carried out from autumn 2025 to early summer 2026, according to Aichi Prefecture. Venue-level operational exercises and tabletop drills for the prefecture and city operations centre have also been held. What public information does not confirm is whether, and at what scale, a full exercise was held that ran accommodation, accreditation and transport together for receiving delegations.
Without an athletes’ village, that kind of end-to-end exercise matters more. When handoffs happen within one site, small mismatches on the first day can be fixed on the spot, but when the port, the hotels and the venues are far apart, the only chance to run document checks and bus dispatch in their real form is in rehearsal.
Hangzhou had a concentrated village and a longer preparation period because of its one-year postponement, so this is not a like-for-like comparison. What can be said is that Hangzhou published what its integrated rehearsal covered, while public documents do not show what similar exercises Aichi-Nagoya held, a difference in transparency. Whether the rehearsals were sufficient is one of the first things a post-Games review should establish.
Can the next Games build an integrating function that is both transparent and strong?
There are broadly three ways to hold the integrating role once a single agency is no longer in charge. The first is to strengthen the organising committee’s in-house departments so that a public body controls the handoffs between accommodation, accreditation and transport. This Games is close to that design, and the cost is that experience takes time to build up, while know-how is scattered when each committee dissolves after its Games.
According to Jiji Press, a person who served as head of planning for the Rugby World Cup 2019 organising committee said the balance works best when the organising body oversees the whole and leaves the practical work of transport and security to private professionals.
The second is to entrust only the integrating function to one company while splitting venue and accommodation work among others. This gains strong coordination, but the selection process and contract for that company would have to be public and decided by competitive tender. Given the lessons of Tokyo 2020, there is no going back to this without guarantees of transparency.
The third is to build no village as a building but to concentrate its functions, registration, dining and the bus terminal, in one place. The hub plan that put team headquarters and a dining hall on the grounds of the modular lodging follows this idea, and the test is whether that hub can hold together the whole system, including the cruise ship and the hotels.
The Games continue until October 4, and the Asian Para Games open on October 18. The cruise ship charter ends on October 6, so the housing layout will change, but the hub at the modular lodging and the national teams’ service desks are designed to carry over.
If the handoff procedures improve in the second half, that will show the in-house department learning; if the same kinds of mistakes continue, the design itself becomes homework for the next Games.
Japanese Reactions to the Aichi-Nagoya Asian Games Problems
These are posts on X, not a measure of Japanese public opinion. The translations are by Sekahan, handles are omitted, and the dates are in Japan time. As of September 25, 2026, the most widely shared posts expressed disappointment at the housing, food and bus problems, but explanatory posts about the contract and the late increase in numbers also spread widely, and views on Dentsu were divided. Direct comparisons with Tokyo 2020 were rare among the top posts; Tokyo mostly appeared as the reason Dentsu was absent.
One of the most widely shared explanations, with about 9,600 likes, came from a user who laid out how the numbers had changed. The post defends the hosts in part, pointing out that Japan had secured the contracted 15,000 places.
ๅๅคๅฑใฎใขใธใขๅคงไผใงใๆตทๅค้ธๆใๅฎฟๆณๆฝ่จญใซๅ ฅใใฆใใใใๆฅๆฌใฎ้ๅถใ็ไธใใฆใใใ ใใฉใ15000ไบบๅใฏๆฅๆฌๅดใ็ขบไฟใใใฎใญใใใๅงใพใฃใฆใฟใใจ2000ไบบใขใใใใใจใใขใธใขใปใชใชใณใใใฏ่ฉ่ญฐไผ๏ผOCA๏ผใใใฎ้็ฅใซใใใใๆบขใใฆใใพใฃใไธ้จใฎใใผใ ๅฝนๅกใใณใผใใฎๅฎฟๆณๅ ใฏใๅๅฝ๏ผNOC๏ผใ่ชๅโฆ
— ๆทฑ่๐ฟfukakusa (@harunotukiyo) 2026ๅนด9ๆ18ๆฅ
Japan’s organisers of the Asian Games in Nagoya are under fire because foreign athletes couldn’t get into their accommodation, but it turns out Japan did secure places for 15,000 people. Once things started, the number had gone up by 2,000. Following a notice from the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA), an unusual request was issued: “please have each country (NOC) arrange and coordinate accommodation for the team officials and coaches who have overflowed.”
Fukakusa, September 18, 2026 (translated by Sekahan)
On transport, a post with about 10,000 likes reacted with surprise to a short-term job listing connected to the Games that sought an on-site supervisor for bus reception and operations support. The poster asked how much judgment and coordination had been left to short-term staff. The post quotes another user’s post, which appears inside the embed. The organising committee is responsible for planning team bus services, while the contractor that runs them has not been disclosed.
ใใใใใชใ้ฉใใใ
— ๆจบๅณถไธ้ๅญ Mariko Kabashima (@KNHjyohokyoku) 2026ๅนด9ๆ22ๆฅ
ใขใธใขๅคงไผ้ข้ฃใฎๆฑไบบใงใ
ใใในๅไปใป้่กใตใใผใๆฅญๅใฎ็พๅ ด่ฒฌไปป่ ใใ็ญๆๅ้ใ
ไปไบๅ ๅฎนใ่ฆใใจใๅใชใๅไปใๆกๅ ใงใฏใชใใโฆ https://t.co/Bfv9ZRm1fa
This really surprised me. A job listing connected to the Asian Games was recruiting, short term, an “on-site supervisor for bus reception and operations support.” Looking at the duties, it isn’t simple reception or guidance: giving instructions to staff, checking progress, collating radio and phone information, confirming bus arrival and departure times, guiding drivers, entering operating data, even changing the times on digital signboards. […] If the transport problems are going to be examined, it shouldn’t stop at the number of buses. Who was directing things on the ground, and with what employment and staffing arrangements were the buses being run? Don’t we need to look that far?
Mariko Kabashima, September 22, 2026 (excerpt, translated by Sekahan)
Posts by news organisations were also widely shared. This one from Jiji Press, with about 4,200 likes, put the anthem error, empty seats and buses that failed to show up side by side in a single headline.
ๅ้ก็ธๆฌกใใขใธใขๅคงไผใๅฝๆญใในใ็ฉบๅธญใใใน็พใใhttps://t.co/KPan6XqheC
— ๆไบใใใใณใ ๏ผๆไบ้ไฟกใใฅใผใน๏ผ (@jijicom) 2026ๅนด9ๆ21ๆฅ
ๆ็ฅใปๅๅคๅฑใขใธใขๅคงไผใงๅ้กใ็ธๆฌกใใงใใพใใๆบๅไธ่ถณใไบบ็บ็ใชใในใๅคใใๅคง่ฆๆจกใชๅฝ้ในใใผใๅคงไผใฎ้ๅถๅใซ็ๅใๆใใใใญใชใไบๆ ใงใใ
Problems pile up at the Asian Games: anthem mistake, empty seats, buses that never showed up
Jiji Press, September 21, 2026 (headline, translated by Sekahan)
Some well-known commentators held back from naming a cause. The journalist Toshinao Sasaki listed the theories circulating and said he wanted to hear from experts and people involved.
ใขใธใขๅคงไผใฎใฒใฉใ็ถๆณใๆฏๆฅไผใใใใฆใใใ ใใฉใใใฃใใไฝใใใใฎใพใจใใ่ชญใใจใ้ๅถใใฎใใฎใใซๆ้ฉใ้ใใฆไฝ่ฃใใชใใฃใใจใใใใใใ้ป้ใๆใใฆใใฉใณในใฎ้ๅถไผ็คพใๅ ฅใฃใฆใใจใใใใใๅ ฑๅใใใฆใใใฉใๅฐ้ๅฎถใ้ขไฟ่ ใฎๆ่ฆใ่ใใใใโ
— ไฝใ ๆจไฟๅฐ (@sasakitoshinao) 2026ๅนด9ๆ22ๆฅ
Every day we hear about the terrible situation at the Asian Games, but what on earth is going on? Reading this summary, there are all sorts of reports: that operations were optimised so tightly there was no slack, or that Dentsu pulled out and a French operating company came in, but I’d like to hear from experts and people involved too.
Toshinao Sasaki, September 23, 2026 (translated by Sekahan)
Across these posts, Japanese users were asking the same question as this article from different angles: who was responsible for connecting the pieces. Explanations built on the contract numbers, doubts about staffing on the ground and news headlines listing the failures coexisted, and many posters, like Sasaki, stopped short of a verdict.
Can a Games Be Cheap, Transparent and Huge at the Same Time?
Reform means deciding what to build after taking the old system apart
Rejecting the single-agency model after the Tokyo 2020 scandals was, in our view, the right decision. The problems at Aichi-Nagoya do not show that the decision was wrong. They show that Japan’s major event management has not yet settled what to build in place of the system it dismantled.
The housing and transport failures that surfaced in the same week occurred at the handoffs between the organising committee, contractors and delegations. When the OCA’s push for a larger programme met the hosts’ choice to “build nothing, stay transparent and split the work,” the question of where to place the function that holds those boundaries together became the biggest question this Games leaves behind.
After dismantling a system that was opaque but powerful, can Japan create an integrating function that is transparent and still powerful? Whether the post-Games review takes on that question will shape how the next international Games and large events are designed.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why does the 2026 Asian Games have no athletes’ village?
Because the organising committee decided in March 2023 not to build one to control costs. Rising material prices were expected to push up construction costs for a village on the former Nagoya racecourse site, so the committee switched to hotels, a cruise ship and modular lodging, and at a September 18, 2026 press conference the Olympic Council of Asia backed the decision, saying it did not want to leave a “white elephant,” Reuters reported.
Who is responsible for accommodation and transport at the Aichi-Nagoya Asian Games?
The organising committee runs room allocation and team bus planning directly, according to its own statements and an Aichi Prefecture document. JTB secured the cruise ship, and GL events holds the contract for 58 venues, covering venue operations, access and accreditation systems and medal ceremonies, but not accommodation or team transport. The contractor running team buses, the operator of the modular lodging and the company that played the anthems have not been disclosed.
How did Japanese social media react to the Asian Games problems?
The most widely shared Japanese posts on X expressed disappointment over housing, food and buses, while explanatory posts about the 15,000-person contract and the late increase to about 17,000 also drew around 10,000 likes. Posts questioned staffing for team buses, and views on whether Dentsu’s absence mattered were divided, as of September 25, 2026.
Did Dentsu’s absence cause the problems?
There is no public evidence that it did. The work planned for Dentsu at Aichi-Nagoya was sponsorship sales, according to Japanese reports, and no public information shows that it was ever expected to handle accommodation or transport. Whether the change in the integrating structure contributed to the problems depends on an internal review that has not yet been published.
Sekahan on YouTube
We publish video summaries of articles like this one, along with short clips built around Japanese reactions.
Reference Links
- Joint Statement by OCA & AINAGOC๏ฝOlympic Council of Asia
- Asian Games: Athletes’ village would have been a white elephant, OCA says๏ฝReuters (via Cyprus Mail)
- Wrong Korea, wrong anthem: Asian Games organizers apologize to S. Korea๏ฝThe Korea Herald
- GL events wins a major contract for the organisation of the 2026 Asian and Para-Asian Games in Aichi-Nagoya, Japan๏ฝGL events
- Hangzhou Asian Games villages complete full-element rehearsal๏ฝHangzhou 2022 Official
- Host City Contract for the Asian Games (Japanese)๏ฝAichi Prefecture
- Response to receiving delegations at the Asian Games (Japanese)๏ฝAichi-Nagoya Asian Games Organising Committee
- On reports about accommodation and food services for delegations (Japanese)๏ฝAichi-Nagoya Asian Games Organising Committee
- Organising committee apologises for a series of problems (Japanese)๏ฝJiji Press
