Key Points
ใปPresident Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping met at the White House on September 24, 2026 and endorsed an extension of the US-China trade truce to January 10, 2027, which cabinet-level negotiators had agreed the day before. No major new deal was announced.
ใปAccording to China’s readout, Xi asked the United States to take the position of “opposing” Taiwan independence, and the two sides agreed to continue their dialogue on AI. The White House issued no readout, and what Trump said in reply on Taiwan has not been made public.
ใปThe United States, with its tariffs and its market, and China, with its grip on rare-earth processing, cannot knock each other out. Instead of settling the contest, they keep adding mechanisms that postpone a collision in trade, on Taiwan and in AI, each through its own channel.
A Summit That Endorsed a Truce Extension and Set Out Each Side’s Words on Taiwan and AI
President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping held talks at the White House on the morning of September 24, 2026, local time. Xi came on a state visit, the first visit by a Chinese president to the White House in 11 years. The day before, on September 23, Trump personally greeted Xi and his wife at Joint Base Andrews.
According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s readout, Xi said on Taiwan: “It is hoped that the U.S. side will adhere to the correct position of opposing ‘Taiwan independence,’ and handle the Taiwan question with caution.” On AI, the readout says “the two sides can continue their dialogue on AI, exchange views on its risks and benefits, and jointly prevent the misuse and abuse of AI,” and that “AI must be kept under human control.” The two leaders also exchanged views on the Middle East, Ukraine and the Korean Peninsula.
On trade, the readout says the two sides’ economic and trade teams “reached a new joint arrangement.” A day earlier, on September 23, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent had announced after talks with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng that the trade truce, due to expire on November 10, would be extended to January 10, 2027. Bessent said, in an interview reported by NBC News, that some deliverables “have not been perfect on the Chinese side” and that he wanted to see over the coming months whether they could be fulfilled.
As of midday September 25 in Japan, the White House had not issued a readout of the talks. There was no joint statement and no joint press conference. Trump told reporters it was a “great meeting” and did not answer questions about Taiwan or AI. On September 25, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded that the Chinese government has no right to represent the people of Taiwan.
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How Tariffs and Rare Earths Produced a Truce
The “Busan agreement” is the one-year US-China trade truce reached at the October 2025 summit in Busan, South Korea, under which each side paused its next escalation against the other. Washington calls it the Busan agreement, while Beijing calls it the joint arrangement of the Kuala Lumpur economic and trade consultations.
What the truce pauses, and what keeps running
According to the White House fact sheet of November 2025, the truce paused China’s sweeping expansion of rare-earth export controls announced that October, along with the 100% additional tariff and the port fees that Washington had threatened. China also committed to buy US soybeans, and the United States lowered the tariffs it had imposed over fentanyl.
The measures that started the fight remain in place. The licensing system that China introduced in April 2025 for exports of seven rare-earth elements is still in effect, and US tariffs on China continue to be levied under other laws. The sequence runs as follows.
| Period | What happened |
|---|---|
| February to March 2025 | The United States imposes tariffs on China over fentanyl. China retaliates with tariffs on farm products and other goods |
| April 2025 | US “reciprocal tariffs” escalate the exchange, and tariffs on both sides exceed 100%. China puts seven rare-earth elements under export licensing |
| May 2025 | In Geneva, both sides suspend the added tariffs for 90 days (extended again in August) |
| October 2025 | China sharply expands rare-earth export controls, and the United States threatens a 100% additional tariff. At the end of the month, the Busan summit sets a one-year truce |
| February 2026 | The US Supreme Court rules that tariffs based on emergency powers are invalid. The United States keeps tariffs on China under other laws |
| May 2026 | Trump visits Beijing. The two sides agree to set up a Board of Trade and a Board of Investment and on farm purchases |
| September 2026 | US and Chinese economic and finance chiefs meet in New York and Washington. The truce is extended to January 10, 2027 |
Compiled from the White House fact sheet, China’s Ministry of Commerce and Reuters reporting, as of September 25, 2026.
The Supreme Court ruling of February 2026 changed what the truce contains. The reciprocal tariffs were the country-by-country surcharges the United States imposed in April 2025 under emergency powers, and the ruling removed their legal basis altogether. Neither Washington nor Beijing has said whether the extended truce covers the same items as in 2025, so it is not yet known what would lapse on January 10.
Why tariffs alone stopped working
The American levers are tariffs, a huge consumer market and export controls on advanced semiconductors. China’s lever is the processing of rare earths and the manufacturing supply chains that depend on it. That combination is one of the reasons why the US stance changed from the autumn of 2025.
Rare earths are a group of 17 elements essential to magnets, motors, communications equipment and weapons. According to the International Energy Agency’s October 2025 commentary, China accounts for about 60% of mining, but about 91% of refining and 94% of magnet production.
| Stage (IEA, 2025) | China’s share |
|---|---|
| Mining | About 60% |
| Refining | About 91% |
| Permanent magnets | 94% |
Mining may be spread around the world, but the exit of the processing chain runs through China.
When China widened its controls in October 2025, the United States said it would respond with a 100% additional tariff, and three weeks later the two sides entered the truce in Busan. US industry has kept arguing that production at car and defense plants would stop before the pain of tariffs was felt.
Export controls on semiconductors and the question of who buys American farm products were also in motion at the time, so the change in the US stance reflects several factors at once. Even so, each side has the power to stop the other but not to defeat it, and that relationship keeps extending the truce.
How AI reached the leaders’ agenda
AI joined trade and Taiwan on the agenda because of events in September. On September 10, the US AI company Anthropic alleged that several Chinese AI firms had illicitly collected outputs from its models and relayed users’ prompts. Two days later, the company’s CEO proposed that AI developers coordinate the pace of development.
Between governments, Bessent and He Lifeng met in New York on September 20 and, for the first time in the US-China economic talks, put AI on the agenda. According to Bessent, as reported by NBC News, the US side proposed a mechanism for the two countries to alert each other to AI incidents affecting national security.
Government-to-government talks on AI date back to 2024. The first dialogue was held in Geneva in May of that year, and in November President Joe Biden and Xi affirmed that humans, not AI, should make decisions on the use of nuclear weapons. China’s phrase this time, that AI must be kept “under human control,” continues that line.
The United States, however, keeps its distance from frameworks for the international governance of AI. At a UN Security Council meeting on September 23, a senior US official said that international dialogue must not be allowed to drift into global governance. On the morning of the summit, Trump himself posted that superintelligence would be a big topic of discussion, but that he wanted to “leave it exactly where it is.”
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Takaichi’s visit two days earlier, and what US allies said first
Just before the summit, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all moved to confirm where Washington stood. On September 21, the foreign ministers of Japan, the United States and South Korea affirmed the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and on September 22 Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi met Trump in New York for about 35 minutes.
At that meeting, the two leaders discussed China-related issues with the coming US-China summit in mind, and confirmed cooperation on AI, semiconductors and critical minerals and the steady implementation of their tariff agreement. According to Japan’s deputy chief cabinet secretary, it was the Japanese side that raised the International Criminal Court (ICC). On September 25, Finance Minister Satsuki Katayama disclosed that Trump had expressed concern about the weak yen at that meeting.
The allies moved because of arms sales to Taiwan. According to NBC News, about $14 billion in US arms sales to Taiwan have been on hold since May, and Trump has described them as a very good bargaining chip. It was also reported that China had told the US side that Xi would not visit if the sale were approved. This is where the worry came from that Taiwan’s security might be placed on the US-China bargaining table.
What Japan wanted to confirm from the outcome of the summit came down to three items: the fate of that arms sale, the fate of US sanctions on the ICC, and progress on Japanese investment in the United States that shows the tariff agreement being implemented.
Can a “Managed New Cold War” Last?
Why was the truce extended by only two months?
The reason the US side gives is time to judge China’s compliance. According to Bessent, as reported by Reuters, China met its soybean purchase commitments but lagged on overall farm purchases and on rare-earth supplies. He also said it was not clear whether a “bigger deal” could be reached. The two months are that period of assessment.
Beyond that, one reading is that neither side has much reason to force a conclusion. The United States has midterm elections in November, and with prices a campaign issue, the administration does not want to reignite tariffs or supply worries. China’s exports this year are growing at double-digit rates, and it does not want to close off the path to advanced semiconductors and American investment. For China too, the truce is time to keep growing while looking for looser controls.
So instead of settling the contest, the two countries extend the deadline. At the Beijing summit in May, they created a Board of Trade and a Board of Investment, turning the dispute into standing ministerial meetings. What is new this time is a time-limited extension and the addition of AI to the economic talks. With each summit the frameworks multiply while the core issues of tariffs, rare earths and semiconductors stay where they were, a pattern that has held since the autumn of 2025.
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Did Trump change US policy on Taiwan?
The position China asked for, “opposing” Taiwan independence, is a step stronger than the “does not support” formula Washington has long used, as both Bloomberg and Reuters have noted. Bloomberg reported that this was the first time Xi had publicly pressed for such a change.
China’s readout records the request but not Trump’s reply. The US side issued no readout, and Trump did not answer questions. What can be said as of September 25 is that only China’s request has been made public, and no change in US policy has been announced.
Reuters reported that some in the Japanese government believe China would have trumpeted any commitment it had obtained. Taiwan’s foreign ministry also responded the same day that the Chinese government has no right to represent the people of Taiwan.
Those who suspect that “Trump handed over Taiwan” have their reasons too: the US side has not disclosed what was said, about $14 billion in arms sales have been frozen since May, and Trump called them a bargaining chip. Against that stands the rebuttal that no policy change has been announced and that China itself has not announced any US commitment.
The next thing to move is that arms sale. In 1982, the United States gave Taiwan assurances that included not consulting Beijing in advance on arms sales (the Six Assurances). Approval would read as a continuation of existing policy, while a continued freeze would strengthen suspicions that the sale was used as a bargaining chip. According to NBC News, a senior US official said a decision would come fairly soon.
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Can AI be managed like nuclear arms?
What the two countries agreed on AI went no further than continuing their dialogue, and the incident alert mechanism is still at the stage of a US proposal. AI resembles nuclear weapons in that accidents or miscalculations could cause both countries great damage. The difference lies in verification: warheads and launchers can be counted and facilities inspected, but AI models and computing resources are hard to see from outside, and there are few ways to confirm that promises are being kept.
The two countries’ motives do not point the same way either. China puts safety first with “under human control” while not slowing its development. The United States rejected international governance at the UN, and its president wants to leave superintelligence “exactly where it is.” Keep racing, but avoid accidents: on this point the two countries’ real interests actually coincide.
What came out of this summit was confirmation that AI will also be handled in the economic talks, on top of the government-to-government dialogue that has run since 2024. No new institution was created. Still, the order of events matters: AI became an agenda item at cabinet-level talks right after an AI company’s allegations. The more places governments have to talk, the more they can slow the speed at which the next allegation turns into a diplomatic problem.
The three items Japan wanted to check
For readers outside Japan: Prime Minister Takaichi met Trump in New York on September 22, two days before the summit, for about 35 minutes, and the Japanese side raised the ICC there. Of the three items still open after that visit, none had a new announcement as of September 25. There was no announcement either approving or rejecting the Taiwan arms sale, no sanctions on the ICC as a whole, which the administration was reported to be considering, and no new project in the Japanese investment in the United States that marks implementation of the tariff agreement. According to Reuters, some in the Japanese government saw the outcome as minimal, while others saw that as reassuring for Japan.
What drew the most attention in Japan was not trade or AI but words about history. At the welcoming ceremony, Trump said the United States and China had been “allies” in the Second World War, and at the state dinner Xi said the two peoples had together resisted “Japanese militarist aggressors.” Opinion in Japan is split between wariness of the United States and China drawing closer on historical narratives and the view that this is a phrase Xi uses routinely, so reading it as a jab at Japan goes too far.
Japan also sits outside the US-China truce. In January and February of this year, China separately introduced export controls targeting Japanese military-related companies and end uses, and the extension of the US-China truce does not cover them. As of September 25, no lifting of those controls had been announced either. The truce exists for the two countries that signed it, and the security of allies is not automatically protected by it.
The next turning points are November and January
The next deadline is January 10, 2027. Before that, in November, China hosts the APEC leaders’ meeting, where the two leaders are expected to meet again. November also brings the US midterm elections. Whether the Trump administration regains room to take a harder line on China after the elections, or keeps stacking extensions, will become clearer after those two dates.
For countries other than the United States and China, extending the truce helps stabilize supply and prices, but it does not necessarily lift controls aimed at them. A group representing European companies in China welcomed the extension while stating that the licensing procedures for rare-earth exports remain opaque. Many countries and companies are in the same position as Japan.
Japanese Reactions to the Trump-Xi Summit
These are posts on X, not a measure of Japanese public opinion. The translations are by Sekahan, handles are omitted, and the like counts are those displayed on September 25, 2026 (JST).
English-language coverage led with trade and AI, but in Japan the reaction was driven by a single remark about history. News outlets widely reported, as unusual, Trump’s description of the United States and China as wartime “allies.” Kotani Tetsuo, a professor at Meikai University who studies the US-Japan alliance and US-China relations, quoted that report with a one-line question that drew about 1,400 likes.
ใชใใฎใใใฎๆฅ็ฑณ้ฆ่ณไผ่ซใ ใฃใใฎใ https://t.co/azfnxvyVrf
— Tetsuo Kotani/ๅฐ่ฐทๅฒ็ท (@tetsuo_kotani) September 24, 2026
What was the Japan-US summit for, then?
Kotani Tetsuo, September 25, 2026, quoting a Nikkei report on Trump’s “allies” remark (translated by Sekahan)
The reply came from the opposite direction. Akihisa Nagashima, a member of the House of Representatives and a former senior vice-minister of defense, argued that the absence of concessions on Taiwan was itself the result that mattered, in a post with about 900 likes.
ใใฉใณใๅคง็ตฑ้ ใๆธๆกใฎๅฐๆนพๅ้กใงไธๆญฉใ่ญฒๆญฉใใชใใฃใใใ ใใใ็ดๅใฎๆฅ็ฑณ้ฆ่ณไผ่ซใฏๆๅณใใใฃใใฎใงใฏ๏ผ https://t.co/gG1CtD2iC0
— ้ทๅณถๆญไน ๆฑไบฌ30ๅบ๏ผๅบไธญใๅคๆฉใ็จฒๅๅธ๏ผ (@nagashima21) September 25, 2026
President Trump didn’t give an inch on the pending Taiwan issue, so doesn’t that mean the Japan-US summit just before it was meaningful?
Akihisa Nagashima, September 25, 2026 (translated by Sekahan)
The most widely shared reading on Taiwan was the one that looked at what China’s announcement left out. Seki Hei, a member of the House of Councillors who was born in China, made the point in a post with about 3,400 likes. What Trump actually said is not public, so this is an inference from silence, not a confirmed fact.
ๆจๆฅใฎ็ฑณไธญ้ฆ่ณไผ่ซใ็ฟ่ฟๅนณใฏใใฉใณใๅคง็ตฑ้ ใซๅฏพใใๅฐๆนพ็ฌ็ซๅๅฏพใใๆฑใใใใๅคง็ตฑ้ ใใใใซใฉใ็ญใใใใซใคใใฆใไปๆฅใฎไบบๆฐๆฅๅ ฑๆฒ่ผใฎไธญๅฝๅดใฎๆญฃๅผ็บ่กจใฏใใฃใใ่จๅใใฆใใชใใใคใพใใใฉใณใใฏใๅฐๆนพๅ้กใซใคใใฆไธญๅฝๅดใฎๆฌฒใใใ่จ่ใ็บใใฆใใชใใใจใฎๅฏ่ฝๆงใๅคงใใฒใจใพใๅฎๅฟใ ใ
— ็ณ ๅนณ (ๅ่ญฐ้ข่ญฐๅกใไธญๅฝใใๅถ่ฃใๅใใๅฝไผ่ญฐๅก็ฌฌไธๅท) (@liyonyon) September 24, 2026
At yesterday’s US-China summit, Xi Jinping asked President Trump to “oppose Taiwan independence,” but the official Chinese announcement carried in today’s People’s Daily says nothing at all about how the President answered. In other words, it is very likely that Trump did not say the words China wanted on Taiwan. A relief, for now.
Seki Hei, September 25, 2026 (translated by Sekahan)
The staging drew attention too. JSF, a military blogger, picked up the two B-1B bombers that flew over Xi’s arrival at Joint Base Andrews and read it as a deliberate message, in a post with about 3,500 likes. The intent is the poster’s interpretation; neither government described the flyover that way.
่จช็ฑณใใ็ฟ่ฟๅนณใๅจๅใใใขใกใชใซ็ฉบ่ปใฎB-1B็ๆๆฉร2ๆฉใใขใใฟใผใใผใใผ็ใใฆใใฃ้ฃใฐใใใใฉใณใใซใใใๆดพๆใชๅซใใใใงใใฃใใ https://t.co/3pOinl7ogZ
— JSF (@rockfish31) September 23, 2026
Two US Air Force B-1B bombers, there to intimidate the visiting Xi Jinping, blasting past with their afterburners lit. A flashy bit of harassment from Trump.
JSF, September 24, 2026 (translated by Sekahan)
Two types of reading sat side by side. One saw Japan as left behind, with the US and China drawing closer on history just two days after Takaichi’s visit. The journalist Shoko Egawa took this further, suggesting that Takaichi’s call at the UN to delete the “enemy state clauses” of the UN Charter (provisions referring to the Axis powers of the Second World War) had backfired. The other saw the lack of results as convenient for Japan, since nothing was given away on Taiwan. Some users also pointed out that Xi routinely describes the United States as a wartime ally in his calls with Trump, cautioning against reading the remark only through Japan’s own diplomacy. By contrast, the truce extension and rare earths drew little reaction.
Is Postponing the Collision Buying Time?
What increased at this summit were deadlines and places to talk. Trade gained two more months, AI joined the agenda of the economic talks, and on Taiwan each side’s words were set side by side. None of these ends the dispute. They are mechanisms to keep the dispute from turning into an accident.
Two great powers that cannot defeat each other are stacking mechanisms in place of a decisive contest. That resembles the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but the difference is that the United States and China are trading blows while remaining deeply tied through trade, finance and corporate activity. If the mechanisms break, the damage would be larger than between two economies that had already separated.
Postponement is a way of buying time. Will the time bought be used to move closer to the underlying problems, or will postponement become the goal itself and lock those problems in place? The next deadline, January 10, is the first chance to measure the answer.
Frequently Asked Questions
Did the US agree to “oppose” Taiwan independence at the summit?
Not publicly. The request to “oppose” Taiwan independence appears only in the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s readout of the September 24, 2026 talks, which does not record Trump’s reply, and the White House issued no readout of its own. As of September 25, no change from the long-standing US formula of “not supporting” Taiwan independence had been announced.
What exactly was extended in the US-China trade truce?
The deadline of the Busan agreement, the one-year truce reached in October 2025, was moved from November 10, 2026 to January 10, 2027, according to Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s announcement on September 23. Neither government has published a list of what the extension covers, and the reciprocal tariffs that the truce once paused no longer exist after the US Supreme Court’s February 2026 ruling.
Did the US and China agree on AI at the summit?
Only to keep talking. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s readout, the two sides agreed to continue their dialogue on AI and jointly prevent its misuse, while the incident alert mechanism that Bessent described on September 20 remains a US proposal, and no new body was announced.
How did Japanese social media react to the Trump-Xi summit?
Japanese posts on X focused less on trade or AI than on Trump’s description of the United States and China as Second World War “allies” and on what Trump did or did not say on Taiwan. One widely shared post asked what the Japan-US summit two days earlier had been for, while others argued that the absence of any announced concession on Taiwan was good news for Japan.
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We publish video summaries of articles like this one, along with short clips built around Japanese reactions.
Reference Links
- President Xi Jinping Holds Talks with U.S. President Donald J. Trump๏ฝChinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Bessent announces extension to Busan agreement with China until January๏ฝFox News
- Bessent says US-China trade truce extended by two months (Japanese)๏ฝNikkei
- U.S. proposes exchanging AI safety alerts with China, Bessent says๏ฝNBC News
- Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Strikes Deal on Economic and Trade Relations with China๏ฝThe White House
- Taiwan’s foreign ministry: the CCP has no right to represent Taiwan (Chinese)๏ฝCentral News Agency
- With new export controls on critical minerals, supply concentration risks become reality๏ฝIEA
- US-China summit “short on results”: optimism and wariness inside the Japanese government (Japanese)๏ฝReuters (Yahoo! News Japan)
