Key Points
ใปOn September 24, 2026, at the White House welcome ceremony for Xi Jinping, President Trump said the two countries had been “allies in World War Two,” and both governments then put the same idea into their official summit documents.
ใปAmerican presidents have spoken of fighting alongside China for decades. What was new was the written record. In the same week, Japan asked the UN to delete the Charter’s “enemy state” clauses, and China answered that they still matter.
ใปNo public material shows a change in U.S. policy toward Japan, and the two leaders reaffirmed their alliance by phone two days later. Still, the week left a record: Japan spoke of reconciliation, while the U.S. and China spoke of wartime partnership.
“Allies” Moved From a Speech Into Official Documents
On the morning of September 24, 2026, U.S. time, President Donald Trump welcomed Chinese President Xi Jinping to the White House for a state visit. In his remarks at the arrival ceremony, Trump said the two peoples’ pursuit of common interests had “even made us allies in World War Two,” and he praised the Flying Tigers, the American volunteer pilots who fought in China. Xi replied that Chinese and Americans “fought shoulder to shoulder against fascist aggression” and that the Chinese people have not forgotten that history.
At the state dinner that evening, according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s English transcript, Xi named Japan directly, saying the two peoples “stood shoulder to shoulder in the fight against Japanese militarist aggressors,” and called their bond “a friendship forged in blood and fire.”
According to the White House fact sheet dated September 25, 2026, “The two leaders recalled that United States and China were allies in World War II and fought side by side to win the war.” The eight-point list of outcomes that China’s Foreign Ministry released on September 26 contains the same sentence. This was not a joint statement. Each side published its own document, and the same line appears in both. Neither document mentions Japan or Taiwan.
Japan’s government reacted cautiously. On September 25, Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara said Tokyo would watch “with great interest” and stay in close contact with Washington. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi told reporters she would not comment on every exchange between third countries, adding that Japan and the U.S. had fought a war, reconciled, and are now allies bound by strong ties.
The timing mattered to Japanese readers. On September 22 in New York, Takaichi had used her speech to the UN General Assembly to call for the “early deletion” of the UN Charter’s enemy state clauses. At a regular press conference on September 23, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun answered that the clauses “remain extremely relevant today.”
On the night of September 26, Japan time, Trump called Takaichi. According to Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the call lasted about 20 minutes, Trump explained the U.S.-China summit in detail, and the two leaders reaffirmed the “unwavering Japan-U.S. alliance.” Takaichi told reporters afterward that she had told Trump the two countries are now allies who trust each other more than any others.
| Date (Japan time) | What happened |
|---|---|
| September 23 | Takaichi asks the UN General Assembly to delete the enemy state clauses (September 22 in New York). China’s Foreign Ministry says the clauses remain highly relevant |
| September 24, night | At the White House ceremony, Trump calls the U.S. and China WWII “allies.” Xi says they fought shoulder to shoulder |
| September 25, morning | At the state dinner, Xi names “Japanese militarist aggressors” |
| September 25 | Takaichi declines to comment on each exchange between third countries. The White House fact sheet is dated this day |
| September 26 | China’s Foreign Ministry releases its eight-point outcomes. That night, Trump calls Takaichi and the alliance is reaffirmed |
Compiled from releases by the White House, China’s Foreign Ministry, the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan and Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as of September 27, 2026.
Related Articles
The Enemy State Clauses and a Familiar Presidential Line
The enemy state clauses are three provisions of the UN Charter, in Articles 53, 77 and 107, that refer to states which were enemies of the Charter’s signatories during World War II. The Charter names no country, but the clauses have long been read as pointing at Japan and Germany.
The UN agreed the clauses were outdated, yet they remain
Article 53 allows action against a former “enemy state” without Security Council authorization if that state renews aggressive policies. Under Article 107, nothing in the Charter overrides measures taken against those states as a result of the war.
In a resolution adopted on December 11, 1995, the UN General Assembly recognized that the clauses “have become obsolete” and said it intended to begin the process of deleting them. At the 2005 World Summit, world leaders wrote in the outcome document that “we resolve to delete references to ‘enemy States'” from the Charter, and the document was adopted without a vote. According to Japan’s Foreign Ministry, China supported both.
The clauses survive because changing the Charter is hard. Under Article 108, an amendment needs a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of member states, including all five permanent members of the Security Council. If any one permanent member does not ratify, deletion stays a resolution on paper. China raised the clauses against Japan in November 2025 and again in September 2026. Tokyo’s position is that the clauses no longer have any effect.
Is it new for a U.S. president to say “we fought together”?
No. U.S. presidents have told Chinese leaders many times that the two countries fought together in World War II. Bill Clinton spoke of “the alliance between our people,” George W. Bush said Americans and Chinese “fought side by side,” and Barack Obama said “we stood together.” Trump himself said “As allies in World War II” at a state banquet in Beijing in May 2026.
What we could not find is an earlier case of this language in an official summit document. It does not appear in the U.S.-China joint statements of 1997, 2009 and 2011, nor in the White House fact sheets of 2015 and May 2026. Some documents remain unchecked, but within the range we examined, this is the only time “allies” was written into an official document, with the same sentence appearing on the Chinese side as well.
| Date | Occasion | What the president said | In the official document? |
|---|---|---|---|
| October 1997 | Jiang Zemin’s visit (Clinton) | “the alliance between our people” | No |
| August 2008 | Beijing (Bush) | “fought side by side” | Not a summit document |
| January 2011 | Hu Jintao’s visit (Obama) | “We stood together” | No |
| September 2015 | Xi’s visit (Obama) | Chinese villagers sheltered American airmen | No |
| May 2026 | Beijing (Trump) | “As allies in World War II” | No |
| September 2026 | Xi’s visit (Trump) | “even made us allies” | “Allies” in both U.S. and Chinese documents |
Compiled from presidential archives and the American Presidency Project. The documents from Clinton’s 1998 visit to China and some summits in the 2000s were not checked.
The China of the war was the Republic of China
The China that fought beside the United States in World War II was the Republic of China, led by Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang sat with Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill at the Cairo Conference in 1943.
The People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, and Beijing describes itself as the government that carries on the Chinese state. Beijing represents “China” in diplomacy because of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, which moved China’s UN seat from the Republic of China in 1971, and because the U.S. recognized Beijing as the sole legal government of China in 1979.
During the war, Taiwan was under Japanese rule. The government that fought the war, the government that represents that state today, and how people in Taiwan see themselves now are three different things.
In recent years, Russia and China have built this war history into national commemorations. Russia made September 3 its day marking the end of World War II and in 2023 added “victory over militarist Japan” to its name. At Beijing’s military parade on September 3, 2025, Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un stood alongside Xi. The phrase “Japanese militarist aggressors” that Xi used at the state dinner is a standard expression in that telling of history.
One War, Three Countries, Three Purposes
Why did Washington put “allies” in writing this time?
No public material explains why the U.S. chose these words now. What can be seen is a pattern. Presidents have used “we fought together” at state visits for decades, Trump repeated it after his May visit to Beijing, and this time it went into the written record.
For two countries that fought each other in Korea and now compete, there is little history they can share comfortably: the wartime partnership of the 1940s and the opening of relations in the 1970s.
This time the line did not stay in a toast. It went into official documents, and China’s list carries the same sentence. Public records do not show whether the two sides agreed on it in advance or during the talks. Trump may have offered it as a diplomatic courtesy, but nothing links it to anything received in return. Unlike concessions on trade or security, history is an easy gift to give at a ceremony.
The very next sentence in the White House fact sheet reads, “Since World War II, the United States’ forward military presence has preserved a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” The U.S. presents itself both as a country that won the war and as the one that has upheld the postwar order. That second sentence appears only in the U.S. document, and Japan is named in neither.
How did China turn “delete” into “vital”?
In 2005, China joined the leaders’ resolve to delete the enemy state clauses. In September 2026, its Foreign Ministry called the same clauses “a vital institutional arrangement aimed at preventing fascism and militarism from threatening international peace and security ever again.” Over two decades, the clauses moved from an outdated provision to be removed to a basis for criticizing Japan.
Beijing’s stated reasons are Japan’s growing defense capabilities and its debate over revising the constitution. The argument runs that Japan joined the UN on the premise of breaking with militarism, so if that premise weakens, the clauses still apply. Whatever Tokyo thinks of it, China has reasons of its own that follow from that account.
The victors’ history supports this criticism of Japan. It can also connect to the claim that the current international order was built by the victors, including China, and to a domestic story that ties the Communist Party’s rule to victory in the war against Japan. The U.S. did not name Japan, but Xi told the ceremony that “Chinese people have never forgotten that part of history,” and named Japan at the dinner. China now stands where it can fold America’s words into its own story.
Japan spoke of reconciliation; the U.S. and China spoke of wartime partnership
Nothing in the public record shows that the U.S. chose “allies” in response to Japan’s UN speech. Neither the American nor the Chinese remarks and documents mention the speech or the enemy state clauses. The exchange over the clauses was not the reason for Washington’s words. It is simply what happened in the same week, seen from Tokyo. Japanese media report that many inside the government see it as Trump’s showmanship and not worth over-reading.
Still, Japan’s discomfort has a basis. In one week, Japan asked for the word “enemy” to be removed from the Charter, China said the word was still needed, and the U.S. wrote down that it had been China’s ally. When Takaichi said on September 25 that there had been a war but the two countries had reconciled, she was using the story Japan and the U.S. shared in 2016, when Obama visited Hiroshima and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Pearl Harbor.
The documents show what the Japan-U.S. alliance covers and what it does not. It covers defense commitments and channels for consultation. The history the U.S. tells to third countries lies outside it. The same U.S. that spoke of reconciliation in Hiroshima in 2016 recalled being China’s ally with Beijing’s leader in 2026. Allies live with both at once.
What changed, and what did not?
Reactions in Japan fall into four broad views. “It is historically accurate and not unusual” and “it is diplomatic flattery” both look at the nature of the remark itself.
The view that “it carries symbolic weight” looks at how the words land: a spoken toast became a written line, and China’s narrative now has official American words beside it. The view that “we should watch institutions and policy, not wording” points to the “ironclad commitments” to Japan’s defense reaffirmed at a U.S.-Japan-South Korea foreign ministers’ meeting on September 21, 2026, and to the phone call after the summit.
What the current evidence supports is a combination: no change in U.S. policy toward Japan can be confirmed from public material, and the way the words land did change. The phone call shows the alliance continuing. Japan’s readout does not show whether it was meant to make up for the history language.
The evidence that would show a real change is still to come: U.S. approval of arms sales to Taiwan, and how Washington handles the deletion of the enemy state clauses. As of late September 2026, there has been no new announcement on either.
Related article
Where to watch next: U.S. action on institutions and policy
Tokyo chose not to protest each word from Washington and Beijing, and instead confirmed the alliance leader to leader. Takaichi said she would not comment on every exchange, and after the call said she had told Trump the two countries are the most trusted of allies. Behind this approach is the view that the U.S. has little reason to fight China or Russia over history, and that protesting would look like an ally interfering in another country’s ceremony.
The next signals of Washington’s attitude toward Japan sit outside talk about history. Deleting the enemy state clauses is a case where the U.S. position will become clear once Japan asks whether to start the amendment process. The U.S. joined the 2005 resolve too.
If Japan calls on the General Assembly to begin the process, whether the U.S. votes in favor or stays silent will say more than any words about history. The clauses are unlikely to disappear soon, but an ally’s stance becomes visible before that point.
Some question the value of pursuing a clause that no longer has effect, arguing it is enough to rebut China whenever it raises the issue. Others argue that as long as the word “enemy” stays in the Charter, China will keep using it as institutional backing. Either way, Washington’s response there, together with its concrete policy on Taiwan and security, is where to look.
A Reddit thread on r/japan
A Reddit thread on r/japan, built on a Jiji Press English report headlined “Japan confused by Trump calling China WWII ally,” drew more than 400 comments, starting about seven hours before the Trump-Takaichi call. Early comments asked what was confusing about a historically accurate remark. The discussion then widened to whether the China of the war is today’s China, and to a sharper point: that the confusion was about why Trump said it now, not about history. A Taiwanese commenter explained why most people in Taiwan do not see themselves as heirs to the China that fought Japan. Later exchanges argued over whether the remark meant Washington was drifting from Tokyo, with others answering that nothing showed that and that a balanced response had already followed Xi’s departure.
Japanese Reactions to Trump Calling China a World War II Ally
These are posts on X, not a measure of Japanese public opinion. The translations are by Sekahan, handles are omitted, and like counts are rounded figures displayed on September 27, 2026 (JST).
The first reaction to spread was the historical correction. The Sankei Shimbun’s post on the morning of September 25, with roughly 2,600 likes, pointed out that the China allied with the U.S. was the Republic of China.
็ฑณไธญใฏๅคงๆฆใงใๅ็ๅฝใใใใฉใณใๅคง็ตฑ้ ใ็ฟ่ฟๅนณๅฝๅฎถไธปๅธญใๅใซ็ฐไพใฎ่จๅhttps://t.co/6m9irhVIGr
— ็ฃ็ตใใฅใผใน (@Sankei_news) September 24, 2026
็พๅจใฎไธญ่ฏไบบๆฐๅ ฑๅๅฝใฏๆฆๅพๆ็ซใใๅคงๆฆๅฝๆใซ็ฑณๅฝใจ่ปไบ็ใชๅ็้ขไฟใซใใฃใใฎใฏ่ฃไป็ณใ็ใใไธญ่ฏๆฐๅฝใ ใฃใใ็ฑณๅคง็ตฑ้ ใไธญๅฝๆๅฐ่ ใๅใซ็ฑณไธญใใๅ็ๅฝใใจ่กจ็พใใใฎใฏ็ฐไพใ ใ
The U.S. and China were “allies” in the war: President Trump makes an unusual reference in front of President Xi Jinping.
Today’s People’s Republic of China was founded after the war, and the country militarily allied with the U.S. during the war was the Republic of China led by Chiang Kai-shek. It is unusual for a U.S. president to describe the U.S. and China as “allies” in front of a Chinese leader.
The Sankei Shimbun, September 25, 2026 (translated by Sekahan)
By September 26, some specialists were asking readers to move past that question. Atsuko Higashino, a professor of international politics, wrote this in a post with roughly 600 likes.
ใใฉใณใใฎใๅ็ๅฝใ็บ่จใซ้ขใใๆฅๆฌใงใฎ่ญฐ่ซใฏใๅฒๅฎ๏ผๆญฃ็ขบ๏ผใใฉใใใใซใจใฉใพใใใใฆใใใใใชๅฐ่ฑกใๅใใฆใใพใใใฉใใใใฎใๅ ใใฎๆฟ็ญ็ๅซๆใ่ใใพใใใใใจๆๆกใใใฎใไปๆฅใฎใใฅใผในใฌใฟใผใงใใhttps://t.co/QoyvOSSFuk
— ๆฑ้็ฏคๅญใAtsuko Higashino (@AtsukoHigashino) September 26, 2026
On Trump’s “allies” remark, I have the impression that the debate in Japan is stuck too much on whether it is historically accurate. Today’s newsletter proposes that we think about the policy implications that lie beyond that.
Atsuko Higashino, September 26, 2026 (translated by Sekahan)
The security researcher Masashi Murano drew attention to the sentence that follows “allies” in the fact sheet. His explanation of how it got there is his own guess, and the post drew roughly 1,100 likes.
ใ็ฌฌไบๆฌกๅคงๆฆไธญใฏ็ฑณไธญใฏๅ็ๅฝใใจใใไปถใฎ็ดๅพใซใใ็ฌฌไบๆฌกๅคงๆฆไปฅๆฅใ็ฑณๅฝใฎๅๆน่ปไบใใฌใผใณในใฏใ่ช็ฑใง้ใใใใคใณใๅคชๅนณๆดใ็ถญๆใใไฝไธไปฃใซใใใใ็ฑณๅฝใฎ็นๆ ใซๅฏไธใใฆใใใใจใใๆ่จใไธฆใถใโฆ
— Masashi MURANO๐ (@show_murano) September 26, 2026
Right after the line that “the U.S. and China were allies in World War II” comes the line, “Since World War II, the United States’ forward military presence has preserved a Free and Open Indo-Pacific contributing to generations of American prosperity.”
Even in a fact sheet, if China insisted strongly on including the first line, I imagine someone racked their brain to add the second to offset it.
Masashi Murano, September 26, 2026 (translated by Sekahan)
After the phone call that night, the Prime Minister’s Office posted a summary of Takaichi’s remarks to reporters, including her answer to a question about the fact sheet. It became the most widely shared post in our search, with roughly 12,000 likes.
ใใ็ฅใใใ
— ้ฆ็ธๅฎ้ธ (@kantei) September 26, 2026
ๆฌๆฅ๏ผ๏ผๆ๏ผ๏ผๆฅ๏ผใ้ซๅธ็ท็ใฏใๆฅ็ฑณ้ฆ่ณ้ป่ฉฑไผ่ซใซใคใใฆใฎใถใใใใไผ่ฆใ่กใใพใใใ
โป่ฆๆจ๏ผ้ๅ ฑ็๏ผ
๏ผ่จ่ ๏ผ
ใ้ซๅธ็ท็ใฏๅ ใปใฉใใใฉใณใใปใขใกใชใซๅคง็ตฑ้ ใจ้ป่ฉฑไผ่ซใใใใพใใใโฆ pic.twitter.com/GDkCgPPth0
(Reporter) The White House fact sheet says the two leaders recalled that the U.S. and China fought together as allies to win World War II. Did President Trump explain this, and did you raise it?
(Prime Minister) I will refrain from going into the specifics of the talks, as they are diplomatic exchanges. On the latter point you raised, I told him that Japan and the United States have now become allies who trust each other more than any others, and we confirmed that we will contribute together to peace and stability in the region and the world.
Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, September 26, 2026 (excerpt, translated by Sekahan)
The concerned view kept spreading the next morning. Kenji Minemura, a China specialist, wrote a long post with roughly 1,200 likes. He also judged the Japan-U.S. talks before and after the summit to be sound alliance management.
ใใฉใณใๆฐใฎใๅ็ๅฝใ็บ่จใฏๅณ่ใฎใชใใใตใผใในใงใฏ็ตใใใใใใฏใคใใใฆในใฎใใกใฏใใทใผใใซๆ่จใใใพใใใใ็ฑณไธญใฏๅ ฑใซๆฅๆฌ่ปๅฝไธป็พฉใจๆฆใฃใใใจใใ็ฟๆฐใฎๆญดๅฒ่ฆณใใ็ฑณๆฟๅบใๆๆธใง่ฟฝ่ชใใใใใงใใๆฅ็ฑณ้ข้ใ็ใไธญๅฝใฎใๆญดๅฒๆฆใใซใไธๅฎใฎๆๆใไธใใใจ่จใใใใๅพใพใใใโฆ
— ๅณฏๆ ๅฅๅธ / Kenji Minemuraใกใซใใฌใๅณฏๆๅฅๅธใฎใคใณใใชใธใงใณในใตใญใณใใใฃใฆใพใ๏ผ (@kenji_minemura) September 26, 2026
Trump’s “allies” remark did not end as improvised flattery. It was written into the White House fact sheet. The U.S. government has endorsed in writing Xi’s view of history that “the U.S. and China fought Japanese militarism together.” I have to say this gave China’s “history war,” aimed at dividing Japan and the U.S., a certain success.
(…)
Against this backdrop, I think the fact that the Japanese and U.S. leaders consulted in person and by phone before and after the U.S.-China summit was appropriate alliance management.
Kenji Minemura, September 27, 2026 (excerpt, translated by Sekahan)
The tone shifted over three days. On September 25, most posts from media and commentators corrected the history, stressing that the wartime ally was the Republic of China. By September 26, the more widely shared worry was that the U.S. had joined China’s “history war,” while some specialists urged attention to the rest of the fact sheet and to policy. After the phone call that night, opinion split between those who welcomed the confirmation of the alliance and those who saw a hurried call, and the worry about the written record did not fade. The like counts above compare posts found in searches at one point in time and do not measure the overall balance of opinion.
Read the Words of History Apart From Alliance Policy
Trump’s “allies” remark repeated a line American presidents have used at state visits for decades. What was new was that the words entered official documents on both sides, and public material does not say why. Nothing shows a change in U.S. policy toward Japan, and the alliance was reaffirmed by phone.
Even so, in one week Japan asked for “enemy” to be removed from the Charter, China said the word was still needed, and the U.S. wrote down that it had been China’s ally. In 2016 the U.S. told a story of reconciliation with Japan; in 2026 it told a story of wartime partnership with China. The U.S. tells different histories to different partners at the same time, and alliance policy is decided somewhere else.
The real question is how issues that involve Japan are handled as Washington and Beijing manage their relationship. How the U.S. responds to deleting the enemy state clauses, and how it decides arms sales to Taiwan, will give firmer answers than any words about history. Watching where those answers appear may say more about where the alliance stands than reacting to each phrase.
Frequently Asked Questions
Were the United States and China really allies in World War II?
Yes. The United States and China fought Japan together in World War II, but the Chinese government at the time was the Republic of China led by Chiang Kai-shek, which attended the 1943 Cairo Conference with Roosevelt and Churchill. The People’s Republic of China, founded in 1949, took China’s UN seat in 1971 and describes itself as carrying on the Chinese state.
Is this the first time a U.S. president called China a WWII ally?
No. Bill Clinton spoke of “the alliance between our people” in 1997, and according to his White House archive said in 1999 that “During World War II, China was our ally”; George W. Bush and Barack Obama also spoke of fighting together, and Trump said “As allies in World War II” in Beijing in May 2026. What is new is the written record: among the summit documents we checked back to 1997, the White House fact sheet dated September 25, 2026 is the only one that calls the two countries WWII allies.
What are the UN Charter’s enemy state clauses?
They are provisions in Articles 53, 77 and 107 of the UN Charter that refer to states which were enemies of the Charter’s signatories in World War II, long read as meaning Japan and Germany. The UN General Assembly called them obsolete in 1995, and world leaders resolved to delete them in the 2005 World Summit outcome document, but deletion requires a Charter amendment ratified by all five permanent Security Council members.
How did Japanese social media react to Trump calling China a WWII ally?
Reactions on X first focused on correcting the history, noting that the wartime ally was the Republic of China. By September 26, 2026, concern that the U.S. had endorsed China’s “history war” spread more widely, while some specialists urged attention to policy, and after the Trump-Takaichi phone call that night, views split between those who welcomed the reaffirmed alliance and those who stayed worried about the written record.
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Reference Links
- Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Advances a Fair and Reciprocal Relationship with China While Hosting Historic State Visit๏ฝThe White House
- President Xi Jinping Attends the Arrival Ceremony at the White House Hosted by U.S. President Donald J. Trump๏ฝMinistry of Foreign Affairs of China
- China and the U.S. Reach Eight-Point Consensus on Outcomes (Chinese)๏ฝMinistry of Foreign Affairs of China
- General Debate Address by Prime Minister Takaichi at the 81st UN General Assembly (Japanese)๏ฝPrime Minister’s Office of Japan
- Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun’s Regular Press Conference, September 23, 2026 (Chinese)๏ฝMinistry of Foreign Affairs of China
- Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk (Japanese)๏ฝMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
- Charter of the United Nations: Full Text๏ฝUnited Nations
- Remarks at a State Dinner Honoring President Xi Jinping of China (2015)๏ฝThe American Presidency Project
