Key Points
ใปPresident Trump said on November 8, 2026 that he expects to meet Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin at the APEC summit in Shenzhen on November 18โ19, and talks on a three-way meeting are under way.
ใปUkraine and others warn of a “Yalta 2.0,” recalling the 1945 conference where great powers settled the fate of countries that were not at the table.
ใปThe three leaders face different kinds of deadlines and bring different bargaining chips: Trump his term and Congress, Russia its postwar economy, China domestic demand and population.
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Trump Signals a Three-Way Summit With Xi and Putin at APEC
U.S. President Donald Trump said on November 8, 2026 that he expects to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders’ meeting in Shenzhen, China, on November 18โ19. According to AFP, Trump said they would discuss many issues “including denuclearization” and also referred to ending the war in Iran. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on November 10 that preparations for a three-way meeting were under way and that “we think it should be possible,” Reuters reported.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on November 3 that Moscow hoped the plan would be finalized “in the coming days” and that China, as host, was the main organizer. China’s Foreign Ministry said on November 4 only that it was communicating with the countries concerned about a possible meeting of the three leaders. As of November 12, the meeting had not been formally announced.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Rubio spoke by phone on November 11. According to Reuters, the State Department said the two agreed on the importance of leader-level dialogue to advance peace and denuclearization, including at any potential trilateral meeting with Russia, while the Chinese readout did not mention denuclearization or a three-way meeting.
The three sides appear to want different things from the meeting. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Putin proposed the summit as a venue to discuss ending the war in Ukraine.
The U.S. and China also disagree over the format. The Wall Street Journal reported on November 9 that China wants the leaders to read out prepared statements in turn, leaving little room for discussion, while the U.S. administration prefers a format that lets the leaders exchange views more freely. A Chinese official told the paper that major issues such as Ukraine could be discussed if the agenda and outcomes were worked out in advance, but that without such preparation China would prefer separate bilateral meetings.
China’s Foreign Ministry has said that its nuclear forces are not on the same level as those of the United States and Russia, and that joining three-way nuclear disarmament talks is not realistic at this stage. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on October 28 that Ukraine does not want “Yalta 2, 3, 4,” and that three countries cannot redivide the world among themselves.
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What Yalta Decided, and Why the Comparison Is Imperfect
Three leaders shaped the postwar order in 1945
The Yalta Conference was the February 4โ11, 1945 meeting at Yalta in Crimea where U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin discussed how to organize the world after the Second World War. Germany’s defeat was near, and the question was what order would follow.
According to the U.S. State Department’s Office of the Historian, the leaders agreed to include France in the postwar administration of Germany, to have governments in Eastern Europe that were “friendly” to the Soviet Union while Moscow promised free elections, and to give the five permanent members of the planned United Nations Security Council a veto.
Countries that were not at the table
For the Far East, the three leaders signed an agreement that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan two or three months after Germany’s surrender. In return, the southern part of Sakhalin would be returned to the Soviet Union and the Kuril Islands would be handed over to it. Japan was not a party, and the handling of the Kurils is tied to the dispute between Japan and Russia over the islands Japan calls the Northern Territories.
The same agreement preserved the status quo in Outer Mongolia and gave the Soviet Union interests in ports and railways in northeastern China. China was not a signatory, and the text said these provisions required the concurrence of Chiang Kai-shek’s government. Arrangements touching territory China claimed were made without China in the room.
The agreements were broadly welcomed in the United States at first. After Roosevelt died in April and tensions with Moscow grew over Eastern Europe, critics said he had “given away” Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia. The State Department’s history notes that the Soviet side also made significant concessions.
How “Yalta 2.0” differs from 1945
In 1945 the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union were allies fighting a common enemy, Nazi Germany, and were discussing the order that would follow victory. The Soviet Union, bound by its neutrality pact with Japan, was not yet at war with Japan. In Eastern Europe, the map had partly been set by how far Soviet troops had advanced before any document was signed. Yalta was less a meeting that cut the world into three than one that set the frame for postwar institutions and occupation.
Today the United States, China and Russia are not allies against a common enemy. Washington and Beijing are rivals in trade and technology, and Washington and Moscow face each other across the war in Ukraine. The name “Yalta” still comes up because the pattern looks similar: great powers talking in a room where the countries most affected, such as Ukraine, European states, Taiwan and Japan, are absent.
The treaty that capped U.S. and Russian nuclear forces has expired
The other agenda item, nuclear arms control, comes at a time when there is no treaty limiting U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons. New START, the treaty that capped those arsenals, expired on February 5, 2026 with no successor. Washington wants a framework that also includes China, whose nuclear forces are reported to be growing.
Beyond its numerical limits, New START allowed up to 18 on-site inspections a year and required exchanges of data on deployed forces, so each side could check the other’s forces. The Arms Control Association, a U.S. group that supported the treaty, argued that this verification gave the U.S.-Russian relationship predictability. When a rival’s forces can no longer be seen, worst-case planning and miscalculation become more likely, so nuclear talks have value in reducing risk, apart from whatever they agree.
China says its arsenal is far smaller than those of the United States and Russia and that those two should cut first. A likely concern behind its caution is that a three-way framework could ask China to accept the same kind of limits while the gap with the other two remains large.
Talks among nuclear powers about their own weapons are different in kind from a deal in which great powers set the territory or ceasefire terms of a third country. The “Yalta” warning is aimed mainly at the second.
Three Powers, Three Different Deadlines
The three economies differ sharply in size and in growth outlook.
| Nominal GDP, 2025 (U.S. = 100) | Real growth, 2025 | 2026 (forecast) | 2027 (forecast) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 100 | 2.3% | 2.3% | 2.3% |
| China | about 64 | 5.0% | 4.5% | 4.0% |
| Russia | about 8 | 1.0% | 0.9% | 0.9% |
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2026 (growth); relative size calculated from IMF data on nominal GDP in U.S. dollars.
Trump’s deadline: his term and the new Congress
Trump’s clock is set by the election calendar. The Twenty-second Amendment bars a third term, so his presidency ends in January 2029. In the November 3 midterm elections, Democrats won majorities in both the House and the Senate, and the new Congress convenes on January 3, 2027.
Because Congress has a role in budgets, sanctions and treaty approval, Trump will have to bargain harder at home from next year. The agenda he has named for the summit is denuclearization and ending the war in Iran. Limited time in office and thinner support in Congress can push a president toward results that can be shown quickly.
America’s bargaining chips are the world’s largest economy, its sanctions on Russia and its tariffs on China. But whether any deal lasts also depends on Congress and on the next administration. Seen from Moscow or Beijing, the question is how long an agreement with Trump would hold.
Why does Russia have a seat at the table?
Russia’s deadline lies in its economy, not in elections. The IMF’s October 2026 World Economic Outlook projects Russian growth of 0.9% in both 2026 and 2027, lower than its April and July forecasts. The Bank of Russia kept its key rate at 14% on October 23 to fight high inflation, so borrowing remains costly for companies and households.
That does not mean Russia will soon run out of the means to keep fighting. The IMF noted in the same October report that higher commodity prices are supporting Russia’s economy even though damage to oil infrastructure has reduced its oil exports. The ability to keep a war going and the ability to grow after it ends are different things, and Russia is keeping the first while wearing down the second.
Russia can sit at the same table as the United States and China despite a far smaller economy because it has a nuclear arsenal on par with America’s and is a party to the war in Ukraine. With the treaty that limited nuclear forces gone, Russia is also a counterpart Washington cannot avoid.
What Russia is reported to want is a discussion of the terms for ending the war in Ukraine. Given its economic conditions, locking in postwar terms while it still has room to keep fighting would work in Russia’s favor.
China has time politically, but not economically
China’s leadership has no term limit of the kind Trump faces. A 2018 amendment to China’s constitution removed the limit on the president’s terms.
The economy and the population run on different clocks. The property slump and weak consumption are problems that have already arrived. The IMF said in February 2026 that a protracted property slump is weighing on consumption and that relying on ever higher exports is not a durable strategy, and its October 2026 outlook has China’s growth slowing to 4.0% in 2027.
Population works over a longer span. According to China’s National Bureau of Statistics, the population fell by 3.39 million in 2025, births totaled 7.92 million, and people aged 60 and over made up 23% of the population at the end of the year.
China’s bargaining chips are its role as host, its position as a key trading partner for Russia during the war, and its weight in global manufacturing. What Beijing has stressed in public is stability in its relationship with Washington. After the call with Rubio, Wang Yi said that stability in China-U.S. relations had “not been easily achieved.”
On the three-way meeting itself, China has said only that it is in communication with the countries concerned, and it has not mentioned denuclearization. With economic problems at home, keeping relations stable appears less costly for China than stepping into a large bargain.
Mismatched deadlines make a grand bargain harder
The time pressures on the three countries differ in kind and in length. For the United States it is Trump’s term and the congressional calendar. For Russia it is the room to keep fighting and its economic strength after the war. For China it is a property and consumption problem that is already here, and a demographic shift that will play out over decades.
Their priorities differ as well. Trump has named denuclearization and ending the war in Iran. Putin is reported to have proposed the meeting to discuss ending the war in Ukraine. China has stressed stable relations with the United States. On nuclear arms control, the United States wants a three-way framework, while China holds that Washington and Moscow should cut first. When the agendas point in such different directions, a comprehensive Yalta-style settlement becomes hard to reach.
If a meeting does take place, the results may be limited, such as the start of an arms control dialogue or a joint statement of intent. The point to watch is that even a limited agreement could include items that bear directly on the future of countries not at the table, such as the terms of a ceasefire in Ukraine.
Japanese Reactions to the Planned U.S.-China-Russia Summit
The posts below are Japanese-language posts on X from November 2 to 11, 2026, Japan time, which we found through public search. In the posts we saw, the most common reaction was that Japan was being left out. They are individual posts, not a measure of opinion in Japan. The translations are ours.
ASEANใงใฎๆฅไธญ้ฆ่ณไผ่ซใฎๅฎ็พใซๆๅพ ใใใใจใใใงใใใใฉใณใใ็ฑณไธญ้ฒ้ฆ่ณไผ่ซใ็ฑณๆ้ฆ่ณไผ่ซใๆจก็ดขใใฆใใใจใฎ่ฉฑใๅบใฆใใใ ใใซใๅคงๅฝ้ๅคไบคใงๆฅๆฌใ้ ญ่ถใใซๅๆๅฝขๆใใใใใจใฎใชใใใใๆฑใขใธใขใงใฎๅคไบค็ใใฌใผใณในใ็ขบไฟใใๆๅณใงใใๆฅๆฌใฏๅบ้ ใใฆใฏใชใใชใใจๆใใพใใ https://t.co/6IgQn4e0KV
— ไปๅ็ฃๆฅญ (@Imakita_920) November 8, 2026
I hope a Japan-China summit can happen at the ASEAN meetings. With talk that Trump is also exploring a U.S.-China-Russia summit and a U.S.-North Korea summit, I think Japan must not fall behind, both so that a consensus is not formed over Japan’s head in great-power diplomacy and to secure a diplomatic presence in East Asia.
[The post quotes a Kyodo News post headlined “Breaking: Prime minister says Japan will pursue dialogue with China that protects its national interests.”]
ๆฅๆฌใฏ่ๅธณใฎๅคใงG2ใใคใซใฟ2.0ใ ใจ่จใใใใใใใใใญใทใใซใใงใซใใใคใชใใณใญใใชใฉใใใใใฆใใใญใทใขไธญๅฝใขใกใชใซใจๆฏ่ผใใฆๆฅๆฌใซไธ็ใๆป ใผใๅใชใใใชใใ้ซๅธใ ใใใ่ชฐใ ใใใไบบ้กใฎๅญไบกใ่ญฐ่ซใใๅ ดใงใๅผใณใซใใใใใใใชใhttps://t.co/K8ruuogYAw
— ใงใณใตใ (@DevilFranken) November 11, 2026
People say Japan is being left out, that this is a G2 or a Yalta 2.0, but compared with Russia, China and America, which have messed up with things like Hiroshima, Chernobyl and COVID, Japan doesn’t have the power to destroy the world in the first place. Whether it’s Takaichi [Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi] or anyone else, there’s no way Japan would be invited to a meeting that discusses the survival of humanity.
[The post quotes the poster’s own earlier post about the use of AI in nuclear launch decisions.]
ๅใฏๅฝๅ ใงใฌใผใ ใใใฏๅใใใใฉใณใใใๅคไบคใง็ฎ่ฆใพใใๆๆใๆใใฆๆฝๅใใใใจๅนณๅๆน้ขใซๅใใฆใใใใใจใซๆๅพ ใใฆใใ
— imai tko (@imaitko) November 6, 2026
ใฆใฏใฉใคใๆฆไบ็ต็ตใจใใใคใฉใณใจใฎๆฆไบ็ต็ตใใคใคในใฉใจใซใจ่ท้ขใๅใใจใใ
็ฌฌไบๆฌกใใฉใณใๆฟๆจฉ็บ่ถณๆใซ่จๅใใฆใใ็ฑณไธญ้ฒใงๆ ธ่ป็ธฎใ้ฒใใใจใใ
I’m hoping that Trump, who has become a lame duck at home, will try to make up for it by achieving striking results in diplomacy and move in the direction of peace.
Things like ending the war in Ukraine, or ending the war with Iran and keeping some distance from Israel.
Or advancing nuclear arms reduction among the U.S., China and Russia, which he talked about when his second administration started.
ใใฉใณใใใใใผใใณใ็ฟ่ฟๅนณใจไธ่ ไผ่ซใใใใใใฃใฆใใใใใใๅฎ็พใใใใ21ไธ็ดใฎใคใซใฟไผ่ซใใใๆฐใปๆชใฎๆข่ปธใใฎๆง็ธใ ใใๆฌๅฎถใคใซใฟใไธๅทจ้ ญไผ่ซใจ่จใใคใคใใๆฆไบใง็ฒๅผใ็ฑณๅฝใฎๅพๅฑๅคๆฐใซใชใฃใฆใใ่ฑๅฝใๆใใใซๆ ผไธใ ใฃใใใใซใใญใทใขใๆใใใซ่กฐๅพฎใใฆใใ่ฑกๅพดใซใชใใใใ pic.twitter.com/Hay7qUTM2n
— Ouvrier(ๆญดๅฒ&ๅฐ็ๅฅฝใใฎๅคๅดไบบๆฐ) (@M3NTTq27dxsqvWB) November 2, 2026
Trump apparently wants to hold a three-way meeting with Putin and Xi Jinping. If it happens, it will look like a “21st-century Yalta Conference” or a “new axis of evil.” But just as at the original Yalta, billed as a meeting of the Big Three, Britain, exhausted by the war and becoming a dependent variable of the United States, was clearly the junior partner, this seems likely to become a symbol of how clearly Russia has declined.
็ฑณไธญ้ฒ3ใซๅฝ้ฆ่ณไผ่ซใๅฐๆฌ่ชญใฟไธใใซใใใใจใซใฏใไธญๅฝใ ใใงใชใใญใทใขใ่ณๆใ ใใ
— ไธญๅฑฑใพใใฒใง@ไปคๅใฎไธไบบๆไบๆพ่ซ (@bintla689) November 10, 2026
ใญใทใขใฏ3ใซๅฝใงไธ็ใไปๅใใใจใ็คบใใใ ใใงๅ ๅๆๅณใใใใใใ
ใใใซใใฆใ็ฑณๅฝใฏใไธญๅฝใไนใฃใฆใใชใใจๅใใฃใฆใใๆ ธ็ฎก็ใซใใ ใใใฎใฏใชใใ ใใใ๏ผ
https://t.co/7PpXCmbwg8
Not only China but Russia, too, would probably agree to turning the U.S.-China-Russia summit into a reading of scripts.
That’s because for Russia, simply being able to show that the three countries run the world is meaningful enough.
Still, why is the U.S. so insistent on nuclear control when it knows China won’t go along?
[link to a Sankei Shimbun article]
Who Will Carry Out the Deal?
The countries not at the table decide whether a deal works
A U.S.-China-Russia summit has not even been confirmed. The name “Yalta” keeps coming up anyway because the countries that would live with the outcome are not in the room where the great powers talk.
The handling of the Kuril Islands, decided at Yalta in 1945 without Japan, still sits between Japan and Russia today. An agreement does not end with the countries that sign it. It works only when the soldiers who hold a ceasefire, the governments that keep sanctions in place and the countries with territorial stakes take part.
For Ukraine, Europe, Japan and Taiwan, the question is less whether the meeting should happen than at what stage, and how, they take part in arrangements that affect them. As each power’s own time pressures shape how it negotiates, who will carry out any deal becomes the heavier question.
Frequently Asked Questions
What does “Yalta 2.0” mean?
“Yalta 2.0” is a label critics have used for a possible Trump-Xi-Putin summit at the APEC meeting in Shenzhen on November 18โ19, 2026, recalling the February 1945 Yalta Conference where U.S., British and Soviet leaders made decisions about countries that were not present, including Japan’s Kuril Islands. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on October 28, 2026 that Ukraine does not want “Yalta 2, 3, 4.”
Has the U.S.-China-Russia summit been confirmed?
No. As of November 12, 2026, the meeting had not been formally announced. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on November 10 that “we think it should be possible,” according to Reuters, while China’s Foreign Ministry said on November 4 only that it was communicating with the countries concerned.
Why is China reluctant to join three-way nuclear arms talks?
China’s Foreign Ministry has said its nuclear forces are not on the same level as those of the United States and Russia and that joining three-way disarmament talks is not realistic at this stage. Beijing’s position is that Washington and Moscow should cut first. New START, the last treaty limiting U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces, expired on February 5, 2026 with no successor.
How did Japanese social media react to the planned summit?
In Japanese-language posts on X from early to mid-November 2026, the most common reaction we saw was that Japan was being left out. Among the posts we translate, one urged Japan not to let great powers reach a consensus over its head, another said Japan had no reason to be invited to talks among nuclear powers, one hoped Trump would seek peace and nuclear arms reduction, and others saw Russia as the junior partner or questioned the scripted format.
Sekahan on YouTube
We publish video summaries of articles like this one, along with short clips built around Japanese reactions.
Reference Links
- US balks at Chinaโs demand for tightly scripted Trump-Xi-Putin summit๏ฝThe Wall Street Journal (via Mint)
- Chinese foreign minister says call with Rubio was ‘positive and constructive’๏ฝReuters (via Devdiscourse)
- Trump says likely to meet Putin, Xi in China๏ฝAFP (via EWN)
- Putin proposes summit with Trump and Xi to discuss Ukraine deal, WSJ says๏ฝThe Korea Times
- Russia, China and U.S. Summit Under Discussion, Kremlin Says๏ฝThe Moscow Times
- Meeting of the United States, China and Russia: Zelenskyy fears a “Yalta 2.0″๏ฝUNN
- The Yalta Conference, 1945๏ฝU.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian
- Yalta (Crimea) Conference, Agreement Regarding Japan๏ฝYale Law School Avalon Project
- Statement on President Trumpโs Comments About Denuclearization Talks with Russia and China๏ฝArms Control Association
- World Economic Outlook, October 2026๏ฝIMF
- How China’s Economy Can Pivot to Consumption-Led Growth๏ฝIMF
- Statistical Communiquรฉ on the 2025 National Economic and Social Development๏ฝNational Bureau of Statistics of China
- Press release on the key rate๏ฝBank of Russia
- Democrats win full control of Congress, ushering in a new era of divided government๏ฝOPB
